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I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of televised executions occupies an odd posi-
tion in the debate surrounding capital punishment. For, within 
the debate concerning the pros and cons of the death penalty 
itself, both proponents and opponents of capital punishment 
have argued for televised executions. While those favoring tele-
vised executions hope to realize their potential deterrent value l 
1. In the last decade, several studies have been conducted regarding the effect of 
well-publicized executions. Compare David P. Phillips, The Deterrent Effict o/Capi-
tal Punishment: New Evidence on an Old Controversy, 86 AM. J. Soc. 139 (1980) (a 
study concluding that the homicide rate drops after a well-publicized execution) and 
Steven Stack, Publicized Executions and Homicide, 1950-1980, 52 AM. Soc. REv. 532 
(1987) ("On the average, a publicized execution story is associated with a drop of 30 
homicides in the month of the story.") and Steven Stack, Execution Publicity and 
Homicide in South Carolina: A Research Note, 31 SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY 599 
(1990) (homicide rate drops 17.5% in months with publicized executions) with Wil-
liam C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Murder and Capital Punishment: A Monthly 
Time-Series Analysis 0/ Execution Publicity, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 722 (1989) (criticizing 
the Stack study). For additional discussion of Phillips' study, see Wayne Kobbervig. 
James Inverarity & Pat Lauderdale, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Comment on 
Phillips, 88 AM. J. SOC. 161 (1982); Hans Zeisel, Comment on the Deterrent Effect 0/ 
Capital Punishment, 88 AM. J. SOC. 167 (1982) (critique of the Phillips study); David 
P. Phillips, The Fluctuation 0/ Homicide After Publicized Executions: Reply to Kob-
bervig. Inverarity. and Lauderdale. 88 AM. J. SOC. 165 (1982); David P. Phillips. De-
terrence and the Death Penalty: A Reply to Zeise/, 88 AM. J. SOC. 170 (1982). See also 
William C. Bailey, Murder. Capital Punishment. and Television: Execution PubliCity 
and Homicide Rates. 55 AM. SOC. REV. 628 (1990); ROBERT B. CIALDlNI, INFLU-
ENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACfICE 141-43 (2d ed. 1988) (studies suggest an increase in 
the rate of crime and violence following the broadcast of violent television shows or 
movies); William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Capital Punishment and Non-Capital 
Crimes: A Test 0/ Deterrence. General Prevention. and System-Overload Arguments, 54 
ALB. L. REV. 681, 682 (1990) ("the analysis shows a significant inverse relationship 
between the amount and type of television coverage devoted to executions and the 
rates of assault, robbery and burglary"); David R. King. The Brutalization Effect: 
Execution Publicity and the Incidence 0/ Homicide in South Carolina. 57 SOC. FORCES 
683 (1978). 
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or to provide broadcast news coverage of a significant public 
event,2 those opposed to televised executions are worried that 
such events will only "increase savagery" or "further coarsen 
our society."3 Moreover, although some commentators are not 
alarmed by the "executions-are-too-gruesome-for-TV" argu-
ment,4 some death penalty opponents hope that "the spectacle 
will so disgust the public that it will turn against capital 
punishment. "S 
Against this backdrop of public debate, several lawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of laws which prohibit the film-
ing of executions have been filed. 6 Among other things, these 
challenges-brought by either death row inmates or journal-
ists-have been based on the ground that the laws infringe upon 
the First Amendment rights of the press. Although the United 
States Supreme Court stated in dicta in 1890 that states may 
restrict the attendance of reporters at executions,7 the Supreme 
2. Michael Schwartz, T. V. in the Death Chamber: A News Story Like Any Other. 
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1991, at A30 ("[T]e1evision, used responsibly, can inform and 
elevate public awareness and discussion of the most important issues facing our soci-
ety."). But see Jonathan Sherman, Pictures At an Execution, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 
1991, at A31 ("The marginal informational benefit of televised executions ... would 
be smalL"). 
3. Howard Rosenberg, TV: A Witness for the Execution, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 
1990, at Fl (quoting University of California, Berkeley professor and media critic Ben 
Bagdikian) (" 'increase savagery' "); George F. Will, Capital Punishment and Public 
Theater, WASH. POST, May 12, 1991, at C7 ("[s]olemnity should surround any per-
son's death, and televised deaths might further coarsen American life"); Anthony 
Lewis, Their Brutal Mirth, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1991, at A15 ("[Television] will 
trivialize executions-reduce them to the level of entertainment, to be clicked on and 
off."); see also Thomas Sowell, Televised Executions? Media Bias at 11, DETROIT 
NEWS, July 22, 1991, at lOA ("The public has no more desire to see executions than 
to see abdominal surgery."). 
4. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at Fl. 
5. Let TV Cameras Show Executions, USA TODAY, July 18, 1990, at 6A (opin-
ion); Robert A. Harper, Jr., Seeing Death: Should Executions Be Public?, NEW 
JERSEY L.J., April 12, 1990, at 9; Anna Quindlen, TV Executions Will Force Us to 
Look Death in the Eye, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 1991, Perspective Section, at 19. Com-
pare Thomas Sowell, supra note 3, at lOA ("No doubt the whole point of televising 
executions is to present a spectacle that will disgust the viewers and therefore under-
mine public support for capital punishment, which the political left has long op-
posed.") with David Wilkes, Televised Coverage Would End Executions, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 30, 1991, at A24 ("Televised coverage would serve as proof to those who are 
ambivalent about the death penalty that state-sponsored executions should be rele-
gated to the past."). 
6. See infra Sections III and IV. 
7. See Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483 (1890). 
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Court has never squarely addressed the question of whether bans 
on televised executions are constitutionally permissible. 
In addressing this question, this Article considers the rela-
tionship between private execution laws and two groups - the 
press and the general public. Part II of this Article discusses the 
history of public executions, paying particular attention to the 
United States. Part III examines the existing statutory schemes 
of states which prohibit public executions. Part IV discusses 
cases which have challenged private execution schemes, and 
Part V explores freedom of the press jurisprudence. The use of 
history in constitutional analysis is the focus of Part VI, while 
Part VII analyzes the constitutionality of private execution stat-
utes under various theories of constitutional analysis. Finally, 
Part VIII integrates First Amendment jurisprudence with the 
"evolving standards of decency" of Trop v. Dulles. 8 
This Article concludes that under existing authority private 
execution statutes are unconstitutional. In reaching this conclu-
sion, this Article first establishes that private execution laws 
were originally enacted for paternalistic reasons and in response 
to a powerful movement in the 1830s to abolish capital punish-
ment. Tracing freedom of the press jurisprudence and the use of 
history in the context of other cases involving constitutional in-
terpretation, this Article then takes the position that the long 
tradition of public executions in the United States and elsewhere 
gives the public a constitutional right to view executions. In par-
ticular, this Article argues that an historical approach, when 
coupled with the complete lack of governmental interests sup-
porting modem private execution statutes, renders such laws un-
constitutional because they impermissibly regulate the content of 
speech. Furthermore, although First Amendment principles 
generally give the press no greater right of access to events than 
the general public, this Article asserts that because the public 
has historically been allowed to witness executions, the press 
must be given effective access to such events. Because television 
is the most effective and influential medium of public informa-
tion in the United States, this Article maintains that the press 
must be allowed to televise executions. 
Finally, this Article asserts that the public has a right to 
8. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
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view executions based upon the Eighth Amendment principle 
that punishments not violate the "evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society." In particular, 
this Article contends that televised executions are necessary for 
the Supreme Court to obtain an accurate measurement of soci-
ety's evolving standards with respect to capital punishment. 
That is, because the Supreme Court uses elected representatives 
as the primary "objective indicia" of which punishments are 
"cruel and unusual," the general public-who elect public offi-
cials or who authorize the death penalty via referendums-must 
be allowed to view executions in order to be fully informed on 
the subject of capital punishment. Ultimately, this Article con-
cludes that the general public must be allowed to view execu-
tions in order for the Supreme Court to accurately determine 
whether capital punishment is a "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" under the Eighth Amendment. 
II. HISTORY OF PUBLIC EXECUTIONS 
Until the nineteenth century, executions in the United 
States were held in public,9 often in the "public squares or com-
mons."10 Following a well-established tradition of public execu-
tions in England,11 capital punishment in the American colonies 
was administered before large crowds.12 According to one ac-
count, at the last public hanging in Philadelphia, which took 
place on May 19, 1837, an estimated crowd of 20,000 people 
witnessed the execution of nineteen-year-old James Moran. 13 At 
such events, religious and community leaders appeared in a pub-
9. G. Mark Mamantov, Note, The Executioner's Song: Is There a Right to Lis-
ten?, 69 VA. L. REv. 373, 375 (1983). The Massachusetts Bay Colony capital statutes 
of 1641 were the first capital punishment laws in this country. THE DEATH PENALTY 
IN AMERICA 7 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982). 
10. LoUIS P. MAsUR, RITEs OF EXECUTION 59 (1989). 
11. DAVID D. COOPER, THE LESSON OF THE SCAFFOLD: THE PUBLIC EXECU-
TION CONTROVERSY IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 1-27 (1974). Indeed, community in-
volvement in executions has been traced back as early as 3000 B.C., when stonings 
and executions were undoubtedly quite common. ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK 
4, 6 (1990); see also JOHN LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1960) 
(tracing the history of capital punishment). 
12. See NEGLEY K. TEETERS & JACK H. HEDBLOM, HANG BY THE NECK 19-46, 
59·63 (1967). 
13. Id. at 34. Although Pennsylvania abolished public hangings in 1834, the vic-
tim had committed a federal offense-piracy-and was therefore not subject to the 
Pennsylvania law. Id. 
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lic ceremony to display their authority and convey their 
messages to the crowd. 14 While the overarching civil theme of 
execution day was the preservation of order, the primary spiri-
tual message delivered concerned the consequences of crime and 
sin. 15 Printed versions of the sermons and confessions helped 
disseminate the execution day message throughout the crowd 
and across the region. 16 
During the 1830s, however, in response to a growing move-
ment to abolish capital punishment, several states began to pro-
hibit public executions. 17 In New York, in 1834, for example, an 
assemblyman, Carlos Emmons, introduced a bill to abolish pub-
lic executions. Initially, his idea met with bitter resistance from 
two groups. IS One faction, viewing public executions positively, 
felt that the practice should be continued. 19 The other group, 
comprised of legislators who favored abolition of capital punish-
ment altogether, rejected Emmons' proposal on Machiavellian 
14. MASUR, supra note 10, at 26. 
15. [d. at 26-27. 
16. [d. at 26. 
17. See Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America. 1787-
1861. 63 AM. HIST. REV. 23, 33-34 (1957). According to one scholar, "[t]he move to 
exclude the public from executions was apparently motivated by a desire to make 
executions more civilized and by a fear that well-publicized executions would fan sen-
timent to abolish capital punishment altogether." Mamantov, supra note 9, at 375 
(footnote omitted). The movement to abolish capital punishment in the United States 
began in 1787 under the direction of Dr. Benjamin Rush. THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
AMERICA, supra note 9, at 13. 
Notably, Justice Marshall suggested that both the Civil War and the privatization 
of executions may have halted much of the furor to abolish capital punishment: "But 
the Civil War halted much of the abolition furor. One historian has said that '[a]fter 
the Civil War, men's finer sensibilities, which had once been revolted by the execution 
of a fellow being, seemed hardened and blunted.' " Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
338-39 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capital 
Punishment in America. 1787-1861. 63 AM. HIST. REV. 23, 46 n.64 (1957». Marshall 
went on to state: "[E]xecutions, which had once been frequent public spectacles, be-
came infrequent private affairs. The manner of inflicting death changed, and the hor-
rors of the punishment were. therefore, somewhat diminished in the minds of the 
general public." Furman. 408 U.S. at 340 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote 
omitted). 
18. PHILIP E. MACKEY, HANGING IN THE BALANCE: THE ANTI-CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK STATE, 1776-1861, at 115-16 (1982). The 
avowed pUrpose of Emmons' bill was to stop "the vicious assemblages and demoraliz-
Ing tendencies of public executions." [d. at 116 (footnote omitted). 
19. [d. at 117. "At least two assemblymen thought that the public would not be 
satisfied with private executions because they could not be sure that the hangings were 
actually being carried out." [d. 
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grounds. Assemblyman Samuel Bowne told the Assembly that 
if executions were to exist at all, he wanted them to be public so 
"that their consequences and enormity might be more vividly 
impressed on the public mind. "20 According to Bowne, the dis-
gust produced by public executions would lead "to the entire 
abolition of capital punishment."21 Bowne's colleague, Amasa 
Parker, concurred; he would vote against Emmons' bill because 
"public executions would be ultimately instrumental in abolish-
ing capital punishments."22 
Although in 1834 Emmons' proposal was destined for fail-
ure,23 in 1835 a senate select committee of the New York legisla-
ture was directed to inquire "into the propriety of abolishing 
public executions." The committee recommended that newspa-
pers be used to disseminate information about executions. 
Although very few people could obtain "ocular evidence" of a 
private execution, the legislators reasoned that newspaper ac-
counts of an execution attested to by "respectable citizens who 
would attend the execution not as private spectators but as pub-
lic witnesses" would protect against any "evasion, perversion, or 
abuse."24 According to the New York committee report: 
"[P]ublic executions ... are of a positively injurious and demor-
alizing tendency."2s Using phrenological principles,26 the report 
mused whether those who attended executions were "of that 
20. ld. 
21. ld. 
22. ld. 
23. Emmons' bill failed to reach a final reading. ld. 
24. MAsUR, supra note 10, at 115 (quoting Senate Document No. 79 in Docu-
ments of the Senate of the State of New York, Fifty-Eighth Session, 18354, 10 (1835) 
[hereinafter Senate Report]). 
25. ld. at 116. 
26. By the time states began to abolish public executions, many Americans be-
lieved in phrenology, a psychological theory developed by two Austrian physicians, 
Johann Spurzbeim and Franz Joseph Gall. Popularized in America by George 
Combe, phrenology analyzed behavior "by viewing the brain as the mind's organ." 
George Combe, who himself connected capital punishment with phrenology, stated 
that the effect of witnessing an execution depended upon one's constitution. Arguing 
that public executions would effectively deter only "all favorably constituted men," 
Combe reasoned that public executions would "operate with least effect precisely on 
those on whom it is most needed, viz., on such as by nature and circumstance are most 
prone to fall before temptation." MASUR, supra note 10, at 98. Horace Mann, a legis-
lator from Massachusetts who first proposed the abolition of public executions in that 
state, was so devoted to phrenology that he named a son after George Combe. ld. at 
100; see also id. ("In the 1830s phrenology provided a compelling argument against 
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class of citizens whose reason is to be convinced, or whose 
animal feelings are to be excited."27 A month after the report, 
the New York legislature adopted a private execution statute 
which took effect on May 9, 1835.28 
The private execution statutes enacted in the various state 
legislatures generally provided for a limited number of witnesses 
at executions and required the sheriff to provide an enclosure for 
the event. 29 For instance, in Pennsylvania, where a private exe-
cution statute was enacted in 1834, the law required that an exe-
cution take place "within the walls or yard of the jail."30 Under 
the Pennsylvania law, the sheriff had the discretion to select the 
witnesses, providing that at least one physician, the attorney 
general, and "twelve reputable citizens" be invited. In addition, 
the law expressly prohibited minors from attending an 
execution.31 
In general, states in New England were the first to enact 
private execution laws, and states in the South and Midwest 
public hangings at a time when social authorities increasingly feared a crisis of public 
order."). 
27. Id. at 116. 
28. MACKEY, supra note 18, at 118. As Philip Mackey's historical study of New 
York concluded: 
The abolition of public hangings both hurt and helped the campaign to abol-
ish all capital punishment. Just as Samuel Bowne and Amasa Parker had 
feared, the removal of hangings from the public view almost certainly re-
lieved the current pressure for total abolition. It decreased the supply of new 
reformers by ending the recurrent scenes which had turned so many against 
the death penalty. It also gave current reformers the impression that the 
government had met them half way. These results were at least partially 
responsible for the absence of anti-gallows activity during the 1836 and 1837 
legislative sessions and the slow progress of the reform even later. On the 
other hand, reformers after 1835 could claim that the abolition of public 
hanging proved that the champions of the gallows were wrong and knew it. 
As a proponent of the death penalty put it in 1848, the end of public execu-
tion "forced the suggestion that capital punishment was barbarous." 
1d. at 119 (citation omitted). 
29. Mamantov, supra note 9, at 375. One author has noted that private execu-
tions "became a theatrical event for an assembly of elite men who attended the execu-
tion by invitation while the community at large was excluded." MASUR, supra note 
10, at 111 (citing several examples); [d. at 112 ("Lucy Colman, anti-slavery lecturer 
and women's rights activist, reported ... that at the execution of Ira Stout 'not one of 
my sex was invited.' "). 
30. Pub. Act No. 127, 1833-34 Pa. Laws 234-235. 
31. 1d.; see also Journal of the Forty.fifth House of Representatives (Harrisburg, 
1834), at 446-47; Report on the Expediency of Abolishing Public Executions (Harris-
burg: Henry Welsh. 1833), at 4. 
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soon followed.32 However, because of lax enforcement and the 
lack of proper facilities to provide private executions, private ex-
ecution laws did not completely eliminate public access to execu-
tions. The end of public executions was not assured until state 
governments took control of executions from the county sheriffs. 
Although Maine, Michigan, and Vermont enacted such legisla-
tion in the 184Os, the majority of state legislatures did not as-
sume control over executions until the early part of this 
century.33 
Four states, unsatisfied that even state-controlled execu-
tions would curtail public executions, imposed criminal penalties 
for the publication of the details of an execution.34 Minnesota's 
private execution statute, enacted in 1889, was typical of such 
statutes. According to the Minnesota law: 
The warrant of execution shall be executed before the hour of sun-
rise of the day designated in the wauant and within the walls of the 
jail in all cases where the jail is so constructed that it can be conve-
niently done therein; but when the jail is not so constructed, the 
warrant shall be executed within an enclosure which shall be higher 
than the gallows, and shall exclude the view of ~ersons outside, and 
which shall be prepared for that purpose .... s 
The statute also provided for witnesses to attend the execution. 
The sheriff of the county was to be present, along with any as-
sistants the sheriff deemed necessary. 36 Besides the sheriff and 
his assistants, the following persons, but no others, were to be 
present at the execution: a clergyman or priest, a physician or 
surgeon, up to three persons designated by the prisoner, and up 
to six other persons designated by the sheriff.37 Although the 
statute left witness selection at the discretion of the prisoner and 
32. Mamantov, supra note 9, at 375 & nn.19-20 (citing laws). 
33. ld. at 377 & nn.26-28 (citing laws). Northeastern states were generally the 
first to adopt state-controlled execution laws. The other state legislatures adopted 
such measures as early as 1885, in the case of Ohio, and as late as 1956, in the case of 
Louisiana. To date, only the states of Delaware and Montana do not require that 
executions be under state control. ld. at 377 n.28 (citing laws and WILLIAM 1. Bow-
ERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 11 (1974». 
34. Act of Feb. 15, 1913, Pub. L. No. 55, § 10, 1913 Ark. Acts 171, 174; Act of 
Apr. 19, 1889, §§ 3, 6, 1889 Colo. Sess. Laws 118, 119-20; Act of Apr. 24, 1889, ch. 
20, §§ 5, 6, 1889 Minn. Laws 66, 67; Act of Mar. 16, 1908, ch. 398, § 10, 1908 Va. 
Acts 684, 686. 
35. 1889 Minn. Laws, ch. 20, § 3. 
36. ld. at § 2. 
37. ld. 
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the sheriff, the statute explicitly provided that "no person so ad-
mitted shall be a newspaper reporter or representative."38 Fur-
thermore, Minnesota's statute provided that "[nlo account ofthe 
details of such execution, beyond the statement of the fact that 
such convict was on the day in question duly executed according 
to law, shall be published in any newspaper."39 Any violation of 
Minnesota's private execution statute was punishable as a 
misdemeanor.4O 
Indeed, in 1906, an indictment was obtained against three 
newspapers for publishing the details of what later proved to be 
the last hanging in Minnesota. In that case, the three newspa-
pers-including The St. Paul Pioneer Press - all published de-
tails of the hanging of William Williams, convicted of killing a 
16-year-old boy and his mother. The strangulation of Williams, 
which took fourteen-and-a-half minutes to complete because the 
hangman failed to consider that both rope and the condemned's 
neck stretches,41 ignited a movement in Minnesota to abolish 
capital punishment, which ultimately succeeded in 1911.42 
In the ensuing court case, State v. Pioneer Press CO.,43 the 
Pioneer Press was fined twenty-five dollars.44 More significantly, 
however, Minnesota's private execution statute was held consti-
tutional by the Minnesota Supreme Court. According to the 
court: 
The evident purpose of the act was to surround the execution of 
38. Id. at § 5. 
39. Id. at § 5. 
40. Id. at § 6. Minnesota's private execution statute was known as the John Day 
Smith law in recognition of the legislator who originally sponsored the bill. A legisla-
tor from Minneapolis, Smith once tried-albeit unsuccessfully-to get Harry Hay-
ward to pray with him on the evening of Hayward's hanging in 1895. WALTER N. 
TRENERRY, MURDER IN MINNESOTA: A COLLECTION OF TRUE CASES 164 (1985). 
41. When the sheriff released the drop, Williams immediately hit the floor because 
the rope was six inches too long. Three deputies, therefore, ran to the platform, pulled 
on the rope, and held Williams' feet off the floor for fourteen and a half minutes until 
he choked to death. After Williams was pronounced dead, spectators cut up the rope 
for souvenirs. TRENERRY, supra note 40, at 163. 
42. TRENERRY, supra note 40, at 156-67; Grant Moos, Newspaper Details of 1906 
Hanging Made It State's Last, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, Mar. 26, 1992, at 19A; 
see also Black, Botched Execution Did in Death Penalty, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB-
ONE, May 12, 1990, at 8A (although capital punishment was not abolished in Minne-
sota until 1911, successive governors commuted every death sentence imposed after 
the botched execution). 
43. 110 N.W. 867 (Minn. 1907). 
44. TRENNERY, supra note 40, at 166. 
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criminals with as much secrecy as possible, in order to avoid excit-
ing an unwholesome effect on the public mind. For that reason it 
must take place before dawn, while the masses are at rest, and 
within an inclosure, so as to debar the morbidly curious. The 
number of witnesses is limited to the minimum, and, to give further 
effect to the purpose of avoiding publicity, newspaper reporters and 
representatives of the press are prohibited, and the publication of 
the event is limited to a mere statement of the fact that the execu-
tion took place. Publication of the facts in a newspaper would tend 
to offset all the benefits of secrecy provided for, and therefore the 
restriction as to publication has direct relation to and connection 
with the other matters embraced within the act.4S 
The court further stated: 
The article in question is moderate, and does not resort to any unu-
sual language, or exhibit cartoons for the purpose of emphasizing 
the horrors of executing the death penalty; but if, in the opinion of 
the Legislature, it is detrimental to public morals to publish any-
thing more than the mere fact that the execution has taken place, 
then, under the authorities and upon principle, the appellant was 
not deprived of any constitutional right in being so limited.46 
365 
Although Minnesota's private execution statute became moot af-
ter capital punishment was abolished in that state in 1911, the 
law was repealed six years later out of concern that Williams' 
hanging could have been concealed from the public.47 
Notwithstanding the challenge to Minnesota's private exe-
cution law, every state permitting capital punishment eventually 
adopted one type of private execution statute or another. 
Although some statutory loopholes allowed sentencing courts to 
order a public execution for prisoners convicted of certain 
crimes such as rape,48 the last public execution in the United 
States was carried out in Galena, Missouri on May 21, 1937.49 
In the past few decades, public attitudes regarding public 
executions have been varied. Although public opinion surveys 
45. Pioneer Press, 110 N.W. at 868. 
46. [d. at 868-69. 
47. Moos, supra note 42, at 19A. 
48. Mamantov, supra note 9, at 376-77. 
49. Scott Armstrong, California Public-TV Station Seeks 'Live' Coverage of Ex-
ecutions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 10, 1991, at 4; see also Will, supra note 3, at 
C7. Notably, it has been contended that the hanging of Rainey Bethea on August 14, 
1936, in Owensboro, Kentucky was the site of the last public execution in the United 
States. This contention is made on the grounds that the Missouri execution took place 
inside a high stockade and only people with special passes were admitted. 
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have shown scant support for televised executions, so both propo-
nents and opponents of the death penalty have argued for a re-
turn to public executions. 51 In addition, several journalists and 
death row inmates have taken legal action in an attempt to pro-
vide for televised executions. 52 Akin to the public executions in 
the past, which inspired poetry and prose,53 these modem legal 
actions have prompted enormous media attention,54 resulting in 
50. For example, a poll taken at the time of Gary Gilmore's execution revealed 
that 86% of those polled were opposed to viewing his execution on television. Tom 
Matthews & Peter S. Greenberg, Gilmore's Countdown, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24, 1977, at 
35; The Harris Survey (Louis Harris & Associates, Inc.), cited in THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 9, at 92. Among lawyers, a random sample of 600 
lawyers found that 68% of lawyers felt executions should not be open to the public. 
Lauren R. Reskin, Majority of Lawyers Support Capital Punishment, A.B.A. J., Apr. 
1985, at 44. 
51. See, e.g., Valerie Richardson, All Bets Off on Effect of Executions on TV, 
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991, at AI. 
52. See infra Section IV. 
53. In his novel, A Tale of Two Cities, for example, Charles Dickens describes 
"Madame Defarge and her fellow 'knitting women' watching stoically as heads rolled 
in Paris in the 18th century." Olson & Daly, Death on Video: Should Executions be on 
the Eleven O'Clock News, Manhattan Lawyer, Apr. 1991, at 13; see also COOPER, 
supra note 11, at 77-87 (discussing the role of Dickens in the public execution contro-
versy in England). For a literary discussion of poetry on the subject of hanging in 
England, see William B. Thesing, The Frame for the Feeling: Hangings in Poetry by 
Wordsworth, Patmore, and Housman, in EXECUTIONS AND THE BRITISH EXPERI-
ENCE FROM THE 17TH TO THE 20TH CENTURY: A COLLECTION OF EsSAYS 123 (Wil-
liam B. Thesing ed., 1990). 
Notably, in American Notes, published in 1842, Dickens also wrote on the subject 
of private executions: 
The prison-yard ... has been the scene of terrible performances. Into this 
narrow, g{'ave-like place, men are brought out to die. The wretched creature 
stands beneath the gibbet on the ground; the rope about his neck; and when 
the sign is given, a weight at its other end comes running down, and swings 
him up into the air-a corpse. 
The law requires that there be present at this dismal spectacle, the 
judge, the jury, and citizens to the amount of twenty-five. From the commu-
nity it is hidden. To the dissolute and bad, the thing remains a frightful 
mystery. Between the criminal and them, the prison-wall is interposed as a 
thick gloomy veil. It is the curtain to his bed of death, his winding sheet, 
and grave. From him it shuts out life, and all the motives of unrepenting 
hardihood in that last hour, which its mere sight and presence is often all-
sufficient to sustain. There are no bold eyes to make him bold; no ruffians to 
uphold a ruffian's name before. All beyond the pitiless stone wall is un-
known space. 
CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES 63 (1842). 
54. See Nightline: Making the Death Penalty Visible (ABC television broadcast, 
May 24, 1991). 
Number 3] TELEVISED EXECUTIONS 367 
an "L.A. Law" episode55 and a movie. 56 The issue of televised 
executions has also sparked debate among American newspa-
pers, legal periodicals and civil rights organizations. 57 
On the legislative front, attempts have been made to man-
date televised executions. For example, in California, a bill 
which would require a warden to allow the media to be present 
at an execution and to televise it if the person being executed 
agreed, was introduced twice in a five month period. The first 
vote on the legislation, taken in May 1991, failed by a vote of 
twenty-four to thirty-seven. The second vote on the measure, 
taken in September 1991, failed by a vote of twenty-eight to 
forty, falling thirteen votes short of the forty-one votes needed 
for passage. 
According to newspaper reports, each time the measure was 
heard it prompted "spirited debate." Assembly member Stan 
Statham and other Republicans who back capital punishment 
opposed the bill, while liberal Democrats, who oppose the death 
penalty, supported it. According to Statham: "There is a hid-
den agenda to this bill and that is to eliminate capital punish-
ment as a law in California." However, Statham said he could 
support the proposal if re-enactments of the crimes committed 
by persons being executed were also shown. "If we're not forced 
to see the crime, we shouldn't be forced to see the execution," he 
said. On the other side of the aisle, Assembly member John Bur-
ton, the bill's author, said that although he opposes the death 
penalty, he does not know what reaction televised executions 
would provoke. 58 "I have no idea how this issue will cut, but I 
55. The "L.A. Law" episode depicted a man dying in a gas chamber. Howard 
Rosenberg, TV: A Witness for the Execution, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 1990, at Fl. 
56. The movie, "Somebody Has to Shoot the Picture," stars Roy Scheider, who 
plays a burned-out photographer hired by the condemned man to take his picture at 
the moment of execution. Ray Loynd, 'Shoot the Picture' Graphic on Death Row, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1990, at F13 (review). 
57. See generally Patrick D. Philbin, Comment, ''Pictures at an Execution," 9 
CoOLEY L. REv. 137, 137 & nn.4-8 (1992) (citing articles and disputes within two 
organizations, the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Coalition to 
Abolish the Death Penalty, over whether executions should be televised); see also Jef I. 
Richards & R. Bruce Easter, Televised Executions: The High-Tech Alternative to Pub-
lic Hangings, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 381, 420 n.169 (1992) (noting dispute within the 
Young Lawyers Division of the American Bar Association). 
58. Greg Lucas, Televised Executions Bill Dies: Assembly Votes It Down for a Sec-
ond Time, S.F. CHRONICLE, Sept. 4, 1991, at A14. 
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believe people have a right to see [executions]," Burton said. 59 
There has even been activity in the United States Congress 
concerning public executions. In 1991, Senator Mark Hatfield 
of Oregon proposed legislation to require public executions for 
any sentence of death imposed under federal law. 60 While the 
bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 23, 
1991,61 no further action was taken in Congress that year. 
III. CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEMES 
Private execution statutes and implementing regulations fall 
into three general categories regarding the admission of wit-
nesses to executions.62 First, in three states - Indiana, Wyo-
ming, and Tennessee - statutes only allow persons either picked 
by the condemned or acting in an official capacity to witness the 
execution.63 Thus, in both Indiana and Wyoming, aside from 
the warden and other official witnesses, only ten friends or rela-
tives of the condemned prisoner may be invited by the con-
demned to witness the execution.64 In Tennessee, aside from the 
official witnesses, only members of the condemned's family may 
be present to witness the execution. Furthermore, it is a Class C 
misdemeanor in Tennessee for the warden of the state peniten-
tiary to permit any person or persons, other than someone au-
59. [d.; see also TV Bill Killed, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 6. Although similar 
bills were under consideration in Florida and Georgia, no actions were taken in 1991. 
Bill Halldin, House Panel Foresees Call for TV Executions, TAMPA TRIB., July 9, 
1991, at 1; 1991 Ga. H.B. 110, available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Bills File (intro-
duced to House Committee on State Institutions and Property on January 15, 1991). 
60. S. 1155, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Jonathan Sherman, Pictures At an Exe-
cution, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1991, at A31 ("In 1985 ... Senator Mark Hatfield of 
Oregon suggested that the public would turn against the death penalty once it peered 
into the execution chamber."). 
61. 137 CONGo REC. S6667 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatfield). 
62. See generally Mamantov, supra note 9, at 378-80. Three states with capital 
punishment statutes, Delaware, Idaho, and Washington, do not have private execu-
tion statutes that fit into one of these three categories. While the Washington statute, 
which states that executions must be conducted in private, does not specify who can 
attend such executions, the Idaho statute does not specify at all who can be in attend-
ance at an execution. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.180 (West 1990); IDAHO 
CODE § 19-2716 (1987). The Delaware statute permits the sentencing court to set the 
execution conditions. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(f) (1987). 
63. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-6-6 (Burns 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-116 
(1982); WYo. STAT. § 7-13-908 (1987 and Supp. 1992). 
64. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-6-6 (Burns 1985); WYo. STAT. § 7-13-908 (1987 
and Supp. 1992). 
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thorized by statute, to witness an execution.6s 
Second, twelve private execution statutes require that a 
given number of witnesses attend an execution, although they 
are silent regarding who those witnesses may be. These provi-
sions generally require the warden or superintendent of the state 
prison to select the witnesses,66 although some state laws do not 
specifically delegate this task to anyone.67 A majority of these 
statutes specifically authorize the condemned prisoner to invite 
friends or relatives to be present at the execution.68 
Finally, the least restrictive type of statutes or regulations 
65. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4O-23-116(b) (1982). 
66. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-705 (1989) (superintendent shall invite "at least 
twelve reputable citizens of his selection"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-404 (1990) 
("such guards, attendants, and other persons as the executive director or his designee 
in his discretion deems desirable, not to exceed fifteen persons"); MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 279, § 65 (Law. Co-op. 1992) ("with the approval of the superintendent, not more 
than three other persons"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.740 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1992) 
(chief administrative officer of the correctional facility shall invite "at least twelve 
reputable citizens, to be selected by him"); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2534 (1989) ("such 
other persons, not exceeding six in number, as the warden may designate"); NEV. 
REv. STAT. § 176.355 (1991) (director of the department of prisons shall invite "not 
less than six nor more than nine reputable citizens"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:6 
(1986) ("the sheriff of the county in which. the person was convicted ... may admit 
other reputable citizens not exceeding 12"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-15 (Michie 
1984) (warden must invite "at least twelve reputable citizens, to be selected by him"). 
67. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-502(d)(2) (Michie 1987) ("At the execution there 
shall be present ... a number of respectable citizens numbering not fewer than six (6) 
nor more than twelve (12)."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 119-5(d) (Smith-Hurd 
1990 & Supp. 1992) (the execution shall be conducted in the presence of "6 other 
witnesses who shall certify the execution of the sentence"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 15:570 (West 1992) ("not less than five nor more than seven other witnesses"); MD. 
ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 73 (1992) (an execution shall take place in the presence of "a 
number of respectable citizens numbering not less than six or more than twelve"); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(5) (1987) ("[t]he warden must allow the execution to 
be observed by 12 witnesses"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-190 (1983) ("At such execution 
there shall be present ... six respectable citizens ... "); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 
(Michie 1991) ("At the execution there shall be present ... at least six citizens who 
shall not be employees of the Department."). 
68. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-705 (1989) ("superintendent shall ... permit 
. . . any persons, relatives or friends, not to exceed five, to be present at the execu-
tion"); CAL. PENAL CoDE § 3605 (West 1993) ("any persons, relatives or friends, not 
to exceed five"); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 65 (Law. Co-op. 1992) ("the immediate 
members of the family of the prisoner" can be present); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.740 
(Vernon 1992) ("any person, relatives or friends, not to exceed five, to be present at 
the execution"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(5) (1987) (three witnesses "may be 
designated by the person to be executed"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2534 (1989) ("such 
other persons, not exceeding three in number as the prisoner may designate"); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 31-14-15 (Michie 1984) ("any person, relatives or friends, not to exceed 
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specifically authorize press attendance at executions. However, 
of the states that allow media attendance,69 no state has a statute 
or regulation explicitly authorizing the audio or video recording 
of an execution. Indeed, many states in this category specifically 
prohibit such audio-visual reproduction.70 In this least restric-
tive type of regulatory scheme, several states specifically permit 
relatives or friends of the condemned person to be present at the 
execution,71 while other statutes do not specify which witnesses 
five"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-190 (1983) ("any relatives of such person, convict or 
felon"). 
69. See ALA. CODE § 15-18-83(a)(6) (1982) ("Such newspaper reporters as may 
be admitted by the warden .... "); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-100 (West 1985) 
("[R]epresentatives of not more than five newspapers in the county where the crime 
was committed, and one reporter for each of the daily newspapers published in the 
city of Hartford."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922:11(2) (West 1985) ("Representatives of 
news media may be present under rules approved by the Secretary of Corrections."); 
FLA. ADMIN. CoDE ANN. ch. 33.15.001 (1990); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-431.250 
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992) ("[N]ine (9) representatives of the news media 
.... "); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-55(2) (Supp. 1992) ("[B]ona fide members of the 
press, not to exceed eight (8) in number .... "); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:49-7(c) (West 
SUpp. 1992) ("The commissioner shall permit eight representatives of the news media 
to be present at the execution .... "); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 2949.25(F) (Baldwin 
1992) ("Representatives of not exceeding three newspapers in the county where the 
crime was committed, one reporter for each of the daily newspapers published in the 
city of Columbus, and such other representatives of the news media as the director of 
rehabilitation and correction authorizes."); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5120-9-54 (1989); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1015 (West 1986) ("[N]ewspapermen from recognized 
newspapers, press, and wire services, and radio reporters .... "); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
61, § 2125 (Supp. 1992) ("not more than six duly accredited representatives of the 
daily newspapers .... "); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-550 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) ("[A] 
group of not more than five representatives of the South Carolina media .... "); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-34 (1988) ("[A]t least one member of the news 
media .... "); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 43.20 (West 1979); Texas Department 
of Corrections, Policy No. 1-82 (1982) (cited in Mamantov, supra note 9, at 380 n.37); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-11(4) (1990) ("[N]ine members of the press and broadcast 
news media . . . provided that the selected news media members serve as a pool for 
other members of the news media as a condition of attendance.").; cf KQED Inc. v. 
Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2323, 2326, No. C-90-1383 RHS (June 17, 1991) 
(in California, journalists cannot be barred from the execution chamber); 1963-64 
Ops. Ga. Att'y Gen. 346 (if the condemned person should express a desire to have 
some member of the press present, the department would be legally authorized to 
admit him). 
70. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 33.15.002 (1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-
431.250 (Michie/Bobbs Merrill Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-55(2) (Supp. 
1992); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5120-9-54(B) (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-550 (Law. 
Co-op. Supp. 1992); Texas Department of Corrections, Policy No. 1-82 (1982) (cited 
in Mamantov, supra note 9, at 380 n.37); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-11(5)(a) (1990). 
71. ALA. CODE § 15-18-83(a)(7) (1982) ("Any of the relatives or friends of the 
condemned person that he may request, not exceeding five in number."); CONN. GEN. 
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can be present at the execution.72 
Notably, most states with private execution statutes specifi-
cally permit a priest, minister, or religious representative of the 
condemned to attend the execution.73 The condemned's attor-
ney has the right to attend a client's execution in some states.74 
STAT. ANN. § 54-100 (West 1985) ("such other adults, as the prisoner may designate, 
not exceeding three in number"); GA. CoDE ANN. § 17-10-41 (1990) ("the convicted 
person may request the presence of ... a reasonable number of relatives and friends, 
provided that the total number of witnesses appearing at the request of the convicted 
person shall be determined by the commissioner of corrections"); Ky. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 16-431.250 (MichielBobbs Merrill Supp. 1992) ("three (3) other persons se-
lected by the condemned"); MIss. CoDE ANN. § 99-19-55(2) (Supp. 1992) ("the com-
missioner may permit two (2) members of the condemned person's immediate family 
as witnesses, if they so request"); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 2949.25(E) (Baldwin 
1992) ("not more than three other persons, to be designated by such prisoner"); OHIO 
ADMIN. CoDE § 5120-9-54(A)(6) (1989) ("[t]hree persons designated by the prisoner 
who are not confined in any state institution"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1015 
(West 1986) ("any persons, relatives or friends, not to exceed five, as the defendant 
may name"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-35 (1988) ("any relatives or 
friends requested by the defendant not exceeding five"); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE 
ANN. § 43.20 (West 1979) ("any of the relatives or friends of the condemned person 
that he may request, not exceeding five in number"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-
11(2)(d) (1990) (friend or relatives "designated by the defendant, not exceeding a total 
of five persons"). But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:49-7(d) (West Supp. 1992) ("The 
commissioner shall not authorize or permit any person who is related by either blood 
or marriage to the sentenced person or to the victim to be present at the execution 
.... "). . 
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 2125 (Supp. 1992) ("six reputable adult citizens 
selected by such warden"); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 24-3-550 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) ("a 
group of not more than two respectable citizens ••• designated by the commissioner"). 
73. ALA. CODE § 15-18-83(a)(4) (1982); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-705 
(1989); ARK. CoDE ANN. § 16-90-502(d)(2) (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 3605 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-100 (West 1985); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 922:11(2) (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-41 (1990); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-38-6-6 (Burns 1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-431.250 (MichielBobbs 
Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:570 (West 1992); MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 27, § 73 (1992); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 65 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MISS. 
CoDE ANN. § 99-19-55(2) (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.740 (Vernon Supp. 
1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2534 (1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:6 (1986); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-15 (Michie 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-190 (1983); OHIO 
REv. CoDE ANN. § 2949.25(E) (Baldwin 1992); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5120-9-
54(A)(5) (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1015 (West 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
61, § 2125 (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-550 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. 
CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-35 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4O-23-116(b)(3) 
(1982); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CoDE ANN. § 43.20 (West 1979); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 77-
19-11(2)(d) (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (Michie 1991); WYo. STAT. § 7-13-
908 (Supp. 1992). 
74. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-502(d)(2) (Michie 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 922:11(2) (West 1985); GA. CoDE ANN. § 17-10-41 (1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 
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Some states' statutes expressly prohibit minors from witnessing 
an execution.75 In other states, convicts are expressly prohibited 
from witnessing an execution,76 or the identity of executioners is 
protected by statute.77 In one state, it is a misdemeanor to have 
photographic or recording equipment at the execution site while 
the execution is taking place,78 while in another state it is illegal 
to print or publish the details of an execution; only the fact that 
the criminal was executed can be printed or published.79 
27, § 73 (1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-190 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-550 (Law. 
Co-op. Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (Michie 1991). Cf. N.H. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 630:6 (1986) (sheriff has the discretion to admit the condemned prisoner's 
counsel). 
75. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-705 (1989) ("nor shall any minor be allowed to 
witness the execution"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3605 (West Supp. 1993) ("nor can any 
person under 18 years of age be allowed to witness the execution"); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 54-100 (West 1985) ("such other adults, as the prisoner may desig-
nate"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:570 (West 1992) ("No person under the age of 
eighteen years shall be allowed within the execution room during the time of execu-
tion."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.740 (Vernon Supp. 1992) ("no person under twenty-
one years of age shall be allowed to witness the execution"); NEV. REv. STAT. 
§ 176.355 (1991) (director of the department of prisons shall invite "not less than six 
nor more than nine reputable citizens over the age of 21 years, to be present at the 
execution"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:49-7(a) (West Supp. 1992) ("six adult citizens"); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-15 (Michie 1984) (no person "under age" is allowed to 
witness an execution); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 2125 (Supp. 1992) ("six reputable 
adult citizens selected by such warden"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-11(7)(b) (1990) 
("Any person younger than 18 years of age may not attend."). Cf. S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-36 (1988) ("The warden ... shall not permit the presence of 
any person under the age of eighteen years, unless a relative, and no relatives of tender 
years shall be admitted."). 
76. ALA. CODE § 15-18-83(b) (1982); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2949.25(E) 
(Baldwin 1992); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5120-9-54(A)(5)-(6) (1989); TEX. CRIM. 
PROC. CODE ANN. § 43.20 (West 1979). 
77. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 119-5(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:49-7(a) (West Supp. 1992). For example, according to the Illinois private 
execution statute: 
The identity of executioners and other persons who participate or perform 
ancillary functions in an execution and information contained in records 
that would identify those persons shall remain confidential, shall not be sub-
ject to disclosure, and shall not be admissible as evidence or be discoverable 
in any action of any kind in any court or before any tribunal, board, agency, 
or person. In order to protect the confidentiality of persons participating in 
an execution, the Director of Corrections may direct that the Department 
make payments in cash for such services. 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 119-5(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992). 
78. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-11(5)(b) (1990). 
79. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-504 (Michie 1987) ("No newspaper or person shall 
print or publish the details of the execution of criminals under §§ 12-28-102, 16-90-
SOl, 16-90-502, and 16-90-505. Only the fact that the criminal was executed shall be 
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IV. CHALLENGES TO PRIVATE EXECUTION STATUTES 
A. Federal Challenges 
In deciding Garrett v. Estelle,80 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit became the first appellate court to 
address the question of whether a state can prohibit the filming 
of an execution. 81 In Garrett, the plaintiff, a television reporter, 
requested permission from the Texas Department of Corrections 
to film the first execution in Texas since 1964 and to film inter-
views with condemned prisoners then confined on "death 
row."82 Rejecting these requests, Texas officials cited Article 
43.1783 and Article 43.2084 of the Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
printed or published."); ARK. CoDE ANN. § 16-90-502(d)(I) (1987) ("No execution of 
any person convicted in this state of a capital offense shall be public; but it shall be 
private. Any officer convicted of violating this subdivision shall be fined in any sum 
not less than one hundred dollars ($100)."). A statute repealed in the State of Wash-
ington in 1982 considered the publication of the details of an execution as obscenity 
and made such publication punishable as such. See WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. 
§ 9.68.020 (West 1988) (noting the law was repealed by 1982 Wash. Laws, ch. 184, 
§ 11 (effective April 1, 1982». 
80. 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978). For a thor-
ough discussion of the Ga"ett case, see Comment, Broadcasters' News-Gathering 
Rights Under the First Amendment: Garrett v. Estelle, 63 IOWA L. REv. 724 (1978) 
and Katherine A. Mobley, Case Note, 11 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1031 (1978). For a 
compelling argument that Ga"ett was wrongly decided, see Jerome T. Tao, Note, 
First Amendment Analysis of State Regulations Prohibiting the Filming of Prisoner Ex-
ecutions, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1042 (1992). 
81. Ga"ett, 556 F.2d at 1275. 
82. Id. at 1276. 
83. Article 43.17 provides that: 
Upon the receipt of such condemned person by the Director of the Depart-
ment of Corrections, the condemned person shall be confined therein until 
the time for his execution arrives, and while so confined, all persons outside 
of said prison shall be denied access to him, or her except his or her physi-
cian and lawyer, who shall be admitted to see him or her when necessary to 
his or her health or for the transaction of business, and the relatives, friends 
and spiritual advisors of the condemned person, who shall be admitted to see 
and converse with him or her at all proper times, under such reasonable 
rules and regulations as may be made by the Board of Directors of the De-
partment of Corrections. 
Ga"ett, 556 F.2d at 1276 n.2. 
84. According to Article 43.20: 
The following persons may be present at the execution: the executioner, and 
such persons as may be necessary to assist him in conducting the execution; 
the Board of Directors of the Department of Corrections, two physicians, 
including the prison physician, the spiritual advisor of the condemned, the 
chaplains of the Department of Corrections, the county judge and sheriff of 
the county in which the Department of Corrections is situated, and any of 
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dure, neither of which specifically authorized a reporter to :film 
executions or to film interviews with inmates. Furthermore, in 
denying the television reporter's requests, Texas officials relied 
on a "media policy"85 regarding executions that had been devel-
oped by the Texas Department of Corrections. 86 
In holding in Garrett that a television reporter has no right 
to film Texas executions, the Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected 
three arguments made by the reporter. First, the court rejected 
the contention that Garrett could find his right to :film execu-
tions in the First Amendment. 87 Relying on the Supreme 
Court's decisions in the companion cases of Pell v. Procunier 88 
and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 89 which held that the govern-
ment is not required to give the press special access to informa-
tion not shared by the public generally, the Garrett court stated 
that "the first amendment does not invalidate nondiscriminatory 
prison access regulations."90 According to the Fifth Circuit, 
"Despite the unavailability of film of the actual execution the 
public can be fully informed; the free flow of ideas need not be 
inhibited. "91 
Second, the Fifth Circuit in Garrett summarily rejected 
Garrett's argument that the state's prohibition of his filming of 
executions denied him equal protection of the law, as other 
members of the press were allowed to utilize their "usual report-
ing tools. "92 According to the court: 
The Texas media regulation denies Garrett use of his camera, and it 
also denies the print reporter use of his camera, and the radio re-
the relatives or friends of the condemned person that he may request, not 
exceeding five in number, shall be admitted. No convict shall be permitted 
by the prison authorities to witness the execution. 
Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1276 n.2. 
85. Among other things, the "media policy" stated that "[n]o recording devices, 
either audio or video, [shall] be permitted either in the execution chamber or monitor 
room." Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1276 n.l. The policy further provided that "[n]o video 
tapes shall be made from the monitor system." Id. 
86. See Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1276; see also Garrett v. Estelle, 424 F. Supp. 468, 
469-70 (N.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussing the devel-
opment of the Texas "media policy"). 
87. Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1279. 
88. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
89. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
90. Garrett, 556 F.2d at 1278. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 1279. 
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porter use of his tape recorder. Garrett is free to make his report by 
means of anchor desk or stand-up delivery on the TV screen, or 
even by simulation. There is no denial of equal protection.93 
375 
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit in Garrett rejected the notion that 
the proposed closed circuit television broadcast of the execution 
was a "publication." Discarding this "prior restraint" attack on 
the Texas media regulation, the court merely stated that 
"[a]ccess for the purpose of filming is not provided, and the first 
amendment does not require that it be provided."94 
In marked contrast, the judgment of the federal district 
court in Garrett 9S - which the Fifth Circuit reversed - would 
have given the press a First Amendment right to televise execu-
tions. Describing capital punishment as "the ultimate act" of 
the state,96 the lower court in Garrett would have permitted at 
least one television reporter with a camera to witness every exe-
cution.97 Regarding such televised executions, the district court 
stated: 
It is argued that such broadcasts would be an "offense to human 
dignity," "distasteful," or "shocking." This may well be true, but 
the question here is whether such decisions are to be made by gov-
ernment officials or by television news directors. The state says, in 
effect, that "We, the government, have determined that the govern-
mental activity in this instance is not fit to be seen by the people on 
television news." In addition to being ironic, such a position is dan-
gerous. If government officials can prevent the public from witness-
ing films of governmental proceedings solely because the 
government subjectively decides that it is not fit for public viewing, 
then news cameras might be barred from other public facilities 
where public officials are involved in illegal, immoral, or other im-
proper activities that might be "offensive," "shocking," "distaste-
ful" or otherwise disturbing to viewers of television news.98 
Ultimately, the lower court in Garrett would have relied on the 
"people themselves" to shield themselves from unacceptable re-
ports by using "selective television viewing. "99 
Paralleling the approach of the Fifth Circuit in Garrett, the 
93. ld. 
94. ld. 
95. Garrett v. Estelle, 424 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd, 556 F.2d 1274 
(5th Cir. 1977). 
96. ld. at 471. 
97. ld. at 472. 
98. ld. at 472-73 (footnote omitted). 
99. ld. at 473. 
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court in Kearns-Tribune v. Utah Board of Corrections 100 also re-
jected the notion that the press has an affirmative right to attend 
executions. 101 In noting that Utah law denied the general public 
the right to attend executions,102 the court framed the issue as 
"whether the plaintiffs have a constitutional right of access to 
attend and report on the actual execution of Gary Mark Gil-
more.ulO3 As did the Fifth Circuit in Garrett, the court in 
Kearns-Tribune cited Pell and Saxbe to conclude that the plain-
tiffs had no First Amendment right to attend executions. 104 
Likewise, the court in Kearns-Tribune also rejected a challenge 
to the Utah statute under the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Referring to "institutional discipline," 
"security," and "reasonable deference to the privacy of the con-
demned manu as rational concerns, lOS the court concluded: 
The plaintiffs have not established any grounds to justify "strict 
scrutiny" of this state legislation. The court, therefore, has applied 
a rational basis analysis under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to determine whether the Utah statute in 
question unconstitutionally excludes the plaintiffs from attendance 
at the Gilmore execution. The plaintiffs have not met their burden 
that [the Utah statute] lacks a rational basis.106 
More recently, KQED San Francisco, one of the largest 
public television stations in northern California, sued the state of 
California to allow photographic coverage of the execution of 
Robert Alton Harris.107 The original lawsuit contended that 
100. 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1353 (D. Utah 1977). 
101. [d. at 1353. 
102. The actual statute provided: 
The warden must invite the presence of a physician and the county attorney 
of the county; and he shall, at the request of the defendant, permit such 
ministers of the gospel, not exceeding two, as the defendant may name, and 
any persons relatives or friends, not to exceed five, to be present at the execu-
tion, together with such peace officers as he may think expedient to witness 
the execution. But no other persons than those mentioned in this section 
shall be present at the execution, nor shall any person under age be permit-
ted to witness the same. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-18 (Supp. 1975). 
103. Kearns-Tribune, 2 Med. L. Rptr. (BNA) at 1353. 
104. [d. at 1353-54. 
105. [d. at 1354. 
106. [d. 
107. Lance Williams, Trial to Open on Executions on TV, San Francisco Examiner, 
Mar. 24, 1991, at AI. For further discussion regarding the suit by KQED, see Steve 
Keeva, Watching a Killer Die: California TV Station Sues to Televise Execution, 
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1990, at 24. 
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Daniel Vasquez, San Quentin's warden, had unlawfully discrimi-
nated against broadcasters when he ruled in 1990 that only 
newspaper reporters could watch the execution of Harris, who 
later won a stay of execution.108 Indeed, before a bench trial was 
scheduled to begin on March 25, 1991, United States District 
Court Judge Robert Schnacke had "rejected a bid by state au-
thorities to dismiss the suit, saying there must be 'appropriate 
balancing' between concerns over security and privacy sur-
rounding an execution and the rights of a free press."l09 
However, a week before the bench trial was scheduled to 
begin, San Quentin's warden barred all journalists from attend-
ing future executions.110 This action, which reversed the 
prison's long-standing policy of allowing journalists without 
cameras or recorders to witness executions,lll prompted Judge 
Schnacke to declare, on the first day of trial, that KQED's suit 
against California might be moot. In a preliminary finding, 
Schnacke said that he was "quite satisfied that neither the press 
nor the public has a First Amendment right" to attend 
executions.112 
Without issuing a definitive ruling, however, Judge 
Schnacke began the trial and frequently questioned KQED news 
108. Williams, supra note 107, at At. 
109. Philip Hager, Trial Ordered Over Right to Televise Executions, L.A. TI¥ES, 
Nov. 10, 1990, at A26. According to the news report, State Deputy Attorney General 
Karl Mayer defended the ban on televised executions to protect the "identities of cor-
rectional staff members, inmates' relatives or other witnesses who might later be sub-
ject to harassment or threats." Id. Conversely, in court briefs, KQED attorney 
William Bennett Turner argued "that with modem technology, a camera could record 
an execution unobtrusively and that the public had a right to view the event as the 
'ultimate sanction' of the criminal justice system." Id. For a recent law review article 
written by the two attorneys for KQED, see William Bennett Turner & Beth S. 
Brinkmann, Televising Executions: The First Amendment Issues, 32 SANTA CLARA L. 
REv. 1135 (1992). 
110. Williams, supra note 107, at A23. 
lIt. Philip Hager, Trial Tests Media's Right at Executions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 
1991, at A3. Although California's Penal Code requires only that "at least [twelve] 12 
reputable citizens" of the warden's choosing attend an execution, California has an 
unwritten policy of admitting up to twenty-five journalists at executions. See Ma-
mantov, supra note 9, at 379 n.37 (citing letter from Phillip Guthrie, Assistant Direc-
tor for Public Information of the California Department of Corrections, stating that 
California's unwritten policy of admitting up to 25 media representatives may be for-
mally implemented). 
112. Rosenfeld, Judge Frowns on TV Deaths, San Francisco Examiner, Mar. 26, 
1991, at A2. 
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director Michael Schwarz. l13 At one point, for example, in ad-
dressing a comment to Schwarz, Schnacke remarked that re-
cording sound in the execution chamber would make the film 
"much more dramatic."114 He continued: "That's what you're 
hoping for .... It would be much more saleable."llS In reply, 
Schwarz said that KQED's motives were journalistic, not com-
mercial. When Schnacke asked further who would be the 
"supreme arbiter" of good taste in the film's airing, Schwarz an-
swered, "the public."116 Nevertheless, Judge Schnacke sug-
gested that the public would probably exercise poor taste in 
watching executions. He noted that "[s]omeone once said that 
no one went broke underestimating the taste of the American 
people." 117 
On the second day of trial, a former California prison direc-
tor, Raymond Procunier, testified for KQED. Procunier testi-
fied that there was no reason to bar the media from covering 
executions. He noted that "[c]orrections people have a tendency 
to set moral standards and meddle in areas that are none of their 
business." In addition, Procunier stated that prison officials' 
concerns that a broadcast journalist might hurl a camera against 
the gas chamber windows "bordered on the bizarre." I 18 On the 
issue of inmate reaction to televised executions, Procunier sug-
gested that watching such executions would not make inmates 
more unruly than if they read newspaper accounts, and that in-
mates would not be more inclined to retaliate against prison 
officials. 119 
113. Id. Schwarz said the station planned to film inmates' faces during the 10 to 15 
minutes it takes the poison gas to kill them, and would air the film late in the evening 
to avoid young viewers. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Rosenfeld, Ex-state Prison Head Backs Using Cameras at Executions. San 
Francisco Examiner, Mar. 27, 1991, at A7. When Deputy Attorney General Karl 
Mayer asked Procunier whether a camera could crack the gas chamber windows, 
Judge Schnacke interjected that "there may be such a thing in this world as a suicidal 
cameraman." Id. Responding to Mayer's concern, however, Procunier replied that a 
camera stand could easily be secured to the floor. Id. Procunier also added that re-
porters are often allowed to bring cameras on prison tours and that, in his 43 years in 
corrections, no camera operator has ever attempted to hide contraband in equipment. 
Id. 
119. Id. 
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On the next day of the trial, the warden of San Quentin, 
Daniel Vasquez, countered with testimony of his own. Accord-
ing to Vasquez, televised executions should be banned for a 
"host" of reasons. 120 First, Vasquez feared that televised images 
of the dying would cause "radicals" to identify guards and take 
revenge. "If we're talking about taking the lives of human be-
ings, I'm afraid that some radicalism might be directed against 
my staff," he said. 121 Second, Vasquez stated that the presence 
of cameras in the execution chamber would disrupt the "deco-
rum" of the proceedings. Suggesting that a cameraman might 
even throw a camera against the gas chamber's windows, Vas-
quez asked: "What if he decided he was going to throw it 
against the glass? What if there was something in it and he was 
going to throw it and try and stop the execution?"122 Finally, 
contradicting Procunier's testimony of the previous day, Vas-
quez suggested that executions agitate inmates. In particular, 
Vasquez testified that "it was a lot more tense" throughout San 
Quentin before Robert Alton Harris' execution which was 
scheduled to occur in April 1990. Vasquez warned that inmates 
could identify prison staff members from television and then re-
taliate against them, either inside the prison or through friends 
on the outside. 123 
Ultimately, before a filled courtroom, Judge Schnacke an-
nounced that California authorities could bar cameras from the 
gas chamber since they pose a risk to prison security.124 In par-
ticular, Judge Schnacke said that testimony from the March trial 
convinced him that the television broadcast of an execution, 
even if it was broadcast some time after the actual event, could 
lead to prison riots. Still photographs or a live broadcast seen by 
inmates with television sets could spark "a severe reaction/' he 
said. 125 Moreover, Schnacke feared that cameras might reveal 
120. Rosenfeld, Warden Afraid of Revenge on Guards if Executions on TV; San 
Francisco Examiner, Mar. 28, 1991, at AS. 
121. ld. Vasquez made this remark after noting that "in this day and age" animal 
rights activists had burned a barn merely because its owner raised veal. ld. 
122. ld. 
123. ld. 
124. Philip Hager, u.s. Judge Upholds Ban on TV Cameras at Executions, L.A. 
TIMES, June 8,1991, at AI. For an article asserting that theKQED case was wrongly 
decided, see Jeff Angeja, Note, Televising California's Death Penalty: Is there a Consti-
tutional Right to Broadcast Executions?, 43 HAsTINGS L.J. 1489 (1992). 
125. Hager, supra note 124, at A25. 
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the identities of guards and other staff members, thereby jeop-
ardizing their safety and the safety of their families. 126 In addi-
tion, Schnacke added that photographers' heavy equipment 
could also be used to break the glass shielding the gas chamber 
at San Quentin, noting that "[t]he warden is not required to 
trust anybody. It's no answer to say the press are all nice people 
and would never do anything irrational."127 Thus, in echoing 
nearly all of the concerns of the San Quentin warden at the 
March trial, Judge Schnacke handed the warden broad discre-
tion. "[p]rison officials are the experts," he stated. "Their rea-
sonable concerns must be accommodated. They not 
unreasonably see risks permitting cameras. Prohibition of cam-
eras is a reasonable and valid regulation."128 
However, Judge Schnacke also decided that rules barring 
126. Judge Schnacke expressed the view that "no rational way appears to prevent 
cameras that are [at an execution] from getting either intentionally or inadvertently 
photographs of the prison personnel." KQED Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. 
(BNA) 2323, 2326 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
127. Hager, supra note 124, at A25. 
128. Rick DelVecchio, Judge Upholds Ban on Cameras at Executions, S.F. 
CHRONICLE, June 8,1991, at Ai. In KQED, it was alleged that the process for select-
ing execution witnesses in California was unconstitutional based upon the well-estab-
lished rule that a law which "vests unbridled discretion in a government official over 
whether to permit or deny expressive activity" is invalid on its face. Plaintiff's Trial 
Brief at 2, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, No. C90-1383RHS (N.D. Cal. 1991) (citing City 
of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755 (1988) and Shuttlesworth v. 
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969». Although the California law gave the warden 
the discretion to choose any "reputable citizens" to witness the execution, the San 
Quentin warden in KQED allowed the Governor's Press Secretary, Robert Gore, to 
select the press witnesses. Perhaps the most questionable move on Gore's part was to 
add to the favored list the politically conservative Sacramento Union, one of the few 
news organizations that had not even requested a permit to witness Robert Alton 
Harris' execution. In so doing, Gore passed over The Sacramento Bee, a paper with 
four to five times the circulation of The Sacramento Union. Although Gore testified 
that he couldn't recall why he favored the Union over the Bee, he admitted that he was 
"well aware" of the "extremely negative" columns being written about the Governor 
by the Bee's political columnist. It was undisputed that Gore's primary job was to get 
favorable press coverage for the Governor and his programs. Plaintiff's Post-Trial 
Brief at 21-22, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2323 (N.D. Cal. 
1991 No. C90-1383RHS); see also id. at 13 (one of the warden's criteria for selecting 
non-press witnesses was their disinclination to talk with reporters). Notwithstanding 
the actions of Gore, Judge Schnacke found that the method of selecting media repre-
sentatives was "reasonable and appropriate." KQED Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. 
Rep. (BNA) 2323, 2327 (N.D. Cal. 1991). This issue is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
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all reporters from executions were "irrational and capricious."129 
"The press has always been there, and the First Amendment 
makes it pretty clear it is important to have a process of news 
gathering," Judge Schnacke said. Adding that the warden's ac-
tion in barring all press attendance from executions "was more 
emotional than rational,"130 Judge Schnacke emphasized: "It 
does appear that where there is a long custom and practice of 
accommodating. the press, and where that has not caused any 
intrusion of any sort . . . it is probably irrational, unreasonable 
and capricious to bar the press at this point."131 On September 
4, 1991, KQED announced that the station would not appeal 
Judge Schnacke's ruling.132 
129. Katherine Bishop, Judge Upholds Ban on Videotaping of Executions at San 
Quentin, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1991, at 9. 
130. ld. 
131. Hager, supra note 124, at At. 
132. TV Bill Killed, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 6. Although Judge Schnacke's 
ruling was not appealed, a videotape of Robert Alton Harris' execution was made, 
pursuant to court order, for the purpose of determining whether California's use of the 
gas chamber is a "cruel and unusual punishment." Although various news organiza-
tions have suggested that the videotape constitutes an official record that must be 
made available to the public, the Harris videotape is currently being stored in a federal 
court vault. Philip Hager, Should Tape of Harris Execution Be Released?, L.A. 
TIMES, May 10, 1992, at A3; William Carlsen & Harriet Chiang, Harris Death Video 
Could be Made Public, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 23, 1992, at At. In an unrelated case, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently rejected an attempt to videotape 
an execution for the purpose of assisting in the assertion of a claim that the punish-
ment of electrocution violates the eighth amendment. See Alan Cooper, 4th Circuit 
Rejects Electrocution Challenge, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 7. 
The controversial appellate process that resulted in the execution of Robert Alton 
Harris, which took place early in the morning on April 21, 1992, was recently the 
subject of a series of essays in The Yale Law Journal See Stephen Reinhardt, The 
Supreme Court, the Death Penalty, and the Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205, 219 
(1992); Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton 
Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225 (1992); Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and 
Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 267 (1992). The 
UCLA Law Review also recently published a series of articles about the Robert Alton 
Harris execution. See Daniel E. Lungren & Mark C. Krotoski, Public Policy Lessons 
from the Robert Alton Ha"is Case, 40 UCLA L. REv. 295 (1992); Charles M. Sevilla 
& Michael Laurence, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents: The Death 
Penalty Case of Robert Alton Harris, 40 UCLA L. REv. 345 (1992). For a first-hand 
account of the execution of Robert Alton Harris, see Michael Kroll, The Unquiet 
Death of Robert Ha"is, UTNE READER, Nov.lDec. 1992, at 92 (reprinted from THE 
NATION (July 6, 1992». 
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B. State Challenges 
In Halquist v. Department of Corrections, 133 a journalist as-
serted that he had the right to attend and videotape an execution 
based upon several provisions of Washington State's constitu-
tion. 134 Despite the court's finding that films convey substantive 
information that cannot be conveyed by other forms of media, 
the Washington Supreme Court rejected the journalist's claim, 
finding that nothing in the history or the wording of the Wash-
ington Constitution provided a "theoretical basis" for the jour-
nalist's contentions. Therefore, the court dismissed the 
journalist's petition against the state officials. 135 
Likewise, although no judicial opinion appears to have been 
written on the subject, in May 1990 a Virginia judge denied a 
request by death row inmate Joseph J. Savino for a public execu-
tion. 136 "If you're asking me to make a decision at this level [on 
a televised execution], I deny such a request," Bedford Circuit 
Judge William Sweeney told Savino. 137 Savino, convicted of kill-
ing his gay lover, had written a letter to Sweeney asking that his 
execution be televised. In Savino's words: "I would like to say 
that since my trial and everything else was public, that my exe-
133. 783 P.2d 1065 (1989) (en bane). 
134. The journalist attempted to ground a right to attend the execution on Wash. 
Const. art. 1, § 30: "The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not 
be construed to deny others retained by the people." West's RCWA Const. Art. 1, 
§ 30 (1988), Halquist, 783 P.2d at 1066. However, the court cited a Washington case, 
State v. Clark, 71 P. 20 (1902), noting that "Clark says nothing about executions, or 
about whether attendance at an execution is the type of 'fundamental, inalienable 
[right] under the laws of God and Nature' which is protected under Const. art. I, 
§ 30." Halquist, 783 P.2d at 1066. 
The journalist also sought to find a right to videotape an execution in Wash. 
Const. art. 1, § 5: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, 
being responsible for the abuse of that right." Id. However, the Washington Supreme 
Court noted a " 'substantial difference between the right to publish already acquired 
information and the right to attend a proceeding for the purpose of news gathering.' " 
Halquist, 783 P.2d at 1067. In the court's eyes, therefore, it followed that "a taping 
ban is a limitation on access to substantive information, not a limitation on dissemina-
tion." Id. 
135. Id. at 1068 (citation omitted). One commentator has noted that the Fifth 
Circuit's reasoning in Garrett is inconsistent with the reasoning of Halquist. See Tao, 
supra note 80, at 1045-65 (noting that the Halquist court found execution films to 
convey substantive information while the Garrett court found that such films were 
only one form of reporting that could accurately describe an execution). 
136. Public Execution Denied, WASH. POST, May 24, 1990, at C4. 
137. Id. 
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cution be made public . . . . I think it should be if it's to be a 
deterrence to anyone else."13s Another death row inmate's as-
sertion that he had a First Amendment right to have his execu-
tion televised was rejected in Florida because of procedural 
deficiencies. 139 
v. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court has decided several cases which ad-
dress the scope of the rights of the press in a democratic society. 
For purposes of delineating the press' right to televise execu-
tions, this section discusses case law in three arguably analogous 
areas: (1) access to trials, (2) cameras in the courtroom, and (3) 
access to prisons. The constitutional basis for finding a right to 
televise executions is the subject of Section VII of this Article. 
A. Access to Trials 
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia,14O the defendant's attorney in a criminal prosecution for 
murder made a pre-trial motion requesting that the proceedings 
be closed to the public. 141 When the prosecutor offered no objec-
tion, the court summarily ruled " 'that the Courtroom be kept 
clear of all parties except the witnesses when they testify.' "142 
Later in the day, however, Richmond Newspapers sought a 
hearing on a motion to vacate the closure order, and the trial 
judge granted the request. At that hearing, Richmond Newspa-
pers argued that no evidentiary findings had been made by the 
court prior to the closure order and that the court had failed to 
consider any less drastic measures to protect the defendant's 
right to a fair trial. 143 Despite these considerations, the trial 
138. ld. 
139. Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 2d 631, 635-36 (Fla. 1982). For an argument that 
private execution statutes deprive death row inmates of their First Amendment rights, 
see Roderick C. Patrick, Note, Hiding Death, 18 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CoNFINEMENT 117 (1992). 
140. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
141. ld. at 559. From a procedural standpoint, before defense counsel requested 
that the proceedings be closed to the public, the defendant in Richmond Newspapers 
was about to be tried for the fourth time. The previous trials had resulted in a convic-
tion reversed on appeal and two mistrials. ld. 
142. ld. at 560 (quoting Transcript of Sept. 11, 1978 Hearing on Defendant's Mo-
tion to Close Trial to the Public 4-5). 
143. ld. at 560. 
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court sided with the defendant and ordered the trial to continue 
the following day" 'with the press and public excluded.' "144 
In what was hailed as "a watershed case" by Justice Ste-
vens,145 the United States Supreme Court reversed the trial court 
in Richmond Newspapers. Specifically, the Court held that a 
state trial judge's order closing a murder trial from public ac-
cess, at the request of the accused, violated the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. However, of the seven Justices who 
recognized a constitutional right of access in Richmond Newspa-
pers, six arrived at their decisions through separate opinions. 
Justice Powell took no part in the case, leaving Justice Rehn-
quist as the sole dissenter. 
An opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, in which Jus-
tices White and Stevens joined, announced the judgment of the 
Court in Richmond Newspapers. To begin his analysis, Burger 
distinguished the case of Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 146 which 
held that members of the press have no "enforceable right of 
access to a pretrial suppression hearing."147 Then, tracing the 
history of trials back to the days before the Norman Con-
quest,148 Burger concluded that "the historical evidence demon-
strates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were 
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been 
presumptively open."149 Burger further emphasized the "signifi-
cant community therapeutic value"150 and the "prophylactic 
purpose"151 of open trials. "The crucial prophylactic aspects of 
the administration of justice cannot function in the dark; no 
community catharsis can occur if justice is 'done in a comer [or] 
in any covert manner.' "152 
144. Id. at 561 (quoting Transcript of Sept. 11, 1978 Hearing on Defendant's Mo-
tion to Vacate 27). 
145. Id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
146. 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
147. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564 (emphasis in original). 
148. Id. at 565. 
149. Id. at 569. 
150. Id. at 570. 
151. Id. at 571. 
152. Id. (quoting 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, reprinted 
in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 184, 188 (R. Perry ed., 1959». Chief Justice Burger 
also noted that "[p]eople in an open society do not demand infallibility from their 
institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observ-
ing." Id. at 572. 
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens noted that, "for 
the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary 
interference with access to important information is an abridg-
ment of the freedoms of speech and of the press ... . mS3 Thus, 
Justice Stevens concluded that the record disclosed no justifica-
tion for the closure order, and that, therefore, the order violated 
the First Amendment. ls4 Justice White concurred with Chief 
Justice Burger on the First Amendment issue, noting the case 
could have been avoided if Gannett had construed the Sixth 
Amendment "to forbid excluding the public from criminal pro-
ceedings except in narrowly defined circumstances."ISS 
In sharp contrast, Justice Brennan's concurrence in Rich-
mond Newspapers would have given the First Amendment a 
"structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican 
system of self-government."ls6 According to one commentator, 
this view of the First Amendment would "protect the free dis-
course necessary for self-government."ls7 In Brennan's words: 
"Implicit in this structural role is not only 'the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open,' but also the antecedent assumption that valuable public 
debate - as well as other civic behavior - must be in-
formed."lss However, because Justice Brennan's approach 
would have made a constitutional right of access "theoretically 
endless," he proposed two limitations on that right.ls9 First, 
"the case for a right of access has special force when drawn from 
an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular pro-
ceedings or information."I60 Second, press coverage must serve 
the purposes of the particular governmental proceeding. 161 
153. ld. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
154. ld. at 584. 
155. ld. at 582 (White, J., concurring). 
156. ld. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
157. Mamantov, supra note 9, at 386. 
158. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 550, 587 (1980) (Brennan, 
J., concurring) (citation omitted) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 270 (1964». According to Justice Brennan: "[P]ublic access to court proceed-
ings is one of the numerous 'checks and balances' of our system, because 'contempora-
neous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse 
of judicial power •.. .''' Id. at 592 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948». 
159. Mamantov, supra note 9, at 386. 
160. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (citation omitted). 
161. Id. at 589, 593-97. 
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The two other opinions in Richmond Newspapers were writ-
ten by Justice Stewart and Justice Rehnquist. Concurring, Stew-
art remained convinced that the right to a public trial should be 
rooted in the Sixth Amendment,162 but he was "driven to con-
clude, as a secondary position, that the First Amendment must 
provide some measure of protection for public access to the 
trial."163 Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, reframed the issue; in-
stead of focusing on the freedom of the press to override the 
defendant's right to a fair trial, he asked whether any provision 
in the Constitution could prohibit what the Virginia judge did in 
Richmond Newspapers. Rehnquist concluded that no such pro-
hibition could be found. 164 
B. Cameras in the Courtroom 
Among legal commentators, the question of whether trials 
should be televised has drawn considerable debate. 165 As one 
commentator has pointed out, in the context of televised cover-
age, "the issue of the proper balance between rights of a free 
press and the right to a fair trial implicates the first, fifth, sixth, 
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion."166 While the United States Supreme Court has never 
squarely addressed the issue of whether absolutely denying the 
press televised access to trials is consistent with the First 
Amendment,167 the Supreme Court has handed down two cases 
related to the issue of televised coverage of trials. 
The Supreme Court first considered the implications of tele-
vised coverage of trials in Estes v. Texas. 168 In that case, Billy 
Sol Estes, a much-publicized financier, was convicted of swin-
162. ld. at 603 (Stewart. J .• concurring). 
163. ld. at 604. 
164. ld. at 606 (Rehnquist. J .• dissenting). 
165. Richard H. Frank. Cameras in the Courtroom: A First Amendment Right of 
Access, 9 COMM/ENT L.J. 749. 752 & n.15 (1987). 
166. ld. at 752 (footnotes omitted). 
167. Several lower courts have concluded that television access to trials can be 
absolutely denied consistently with the first amendment. See, e.g., United States v. 
Hastings. 695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir.). reh'g en banc denied per curiam, 704 F.2d 559, 
cert. denied. 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting System. 
Inc .• 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984). cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985); United States v. 
Edwards. 785 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of these cases. see Frank. 
supra note 165. at 765-772. 
168. 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
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dling after a trial of great notoriety which was broadcast on tele-
vision over Estes' objection. 169 In narrowly reversing Estes' 
conviction, the Supreme Court held that the television coverage 
of Estes' trial deprived him of his due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.17o While Justice Harlan's swing vote 
in Estes remains controversial among commentators,171 a major-
ity of the Court in Estes emphasized the disruptive nature of the 
television coverage in reversing Estes' conviction. l72 In reaching 
this narrow decision, the Court emphasized: "When the ad-
vances in these arts permit reporting by printing press or by tele-
vision without their present hazards to a fair trial we will have 
another case."173 
In 1981, the Supreme Court again considered the implica-
tions of electronic coverage in deciding Chandler v. Florida. 174 
In that case, the Court stated that television coverage of trials is 
not per se unconstitutional. 175 Indeed, "[a]bsent a showing of 
prejudice" to the defendants in Chandler, the Court was unwill-
ing to invalidate Florida's rule allowing television coverage of 
169. ld. at 535-38. 
170. ld. at 535. 
171. According to one commentator, Justice Harlan's opinion in Estes has been 
interpreted as: (1) "erecting a per se ban on television coverage of trial proceedings in 
accord with the opinions of Clark and Warren;" (2) "limiting the application of the 
Court's prohibition to notorious trials;" and (3) "limiting the application of the 
Court's prohibition to the facts of the Estes case." Frank, supra note 165, at 758 
(footnotes omitted). The third view, which has "emerged as the Supreme Court's 
position," id. at 758 n.48 (citations omitted), is supported by language from Justice 
Harlan's statement: "At the present juncture I can only conclude that televised trials, 
at least in cases like this one, possess such capabilities for interfering with the even 
course of the judicial process that they are constitutionally banned." Estes, 381 U.S. 
at 596 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
172. In describing the atmosphere created by coverage of the pre-trial hearings, 
Justice Clark wrote: 
The videotapes of these hearings clearly illustrate that the picture presented 
was not one of that judicial serenity and calm to which petitioner was enti-
tled . . . . Indeed, at least 12 cameramen were engaged in the courtroom 
throughout the hearing taking motion and still pictures and televising the 
proceedings. Cables and wires were snaked across the courtroom fioor, 
three microphones were on the judge's bench and others were beamed at the 
jury box and the counsel table. 
Estes, 381 U.S. at 536 (citations omitted); see also id. at 552-53, 586 app. (Warren, 
C.J., concurring) (discussing the conduct of reporters in the courtroom with photo-
graphs as an appendix). 
173. Estes, 381 U.S. at 540. 
174. 449 U.S. 560 (1981). 
175. ld. at 582. 
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trials. 176 Thus, the Chandler majority limited the holding of Es-
tes to those trials" 'utterly corrupted' by press coverage."177 
C. Prison Access 
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court decided the com-
panion cases of Pell v. Procunier 178 and Saxbe v. Washington 
Post CO.179 In Pell several prison inmates and journalists 
brought suit challenging section 415.071 of the California De-
partment of Corrections Manual, which provided that " '[p ]ress 
and other media interviews with specific individual inmates will 
not be permitted.' "180 Focusing initially on the proposition that 
" '[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal 
or limitation of many privileges and rights,' "181 the Court con-
cluded that security considerations were important enough to 
justify the imposition of some restrictions regarding face-to-face 
interviews with inmates. 182 "So long as reasonable and effective 
means of communication remain open and no discrimination in 
terms of content is involved . . . 'prison officials must be ac-
corded latitude.' "183 Recognizing that there" 'may be particu-
lar qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion 
and questioning,' "184 the Court went on to conclude that writ-
ten communication between the media and the inmates, and 
communication through inmates' families, friends, clergy, and 
attorneys affords inmates a "substantially unimpeded channel 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 573 n.8 (quoting Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798 (1975». In 
particular, the Court concluded that Estes "is not to be read as announcing a constitu-
tional rule barring stilI photographic, radio, and television coverage in all cases and 
under all circumstances." Id. at 573. 
178. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
179. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
180. Pel/, 417 U.S. at 819. 
181. Id. at 822 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948». "In the First 
Amendment context a corollary of this principle is that a prison inmate retains those 
First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with 
the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Id. 
182. Id. at 827. 
183. Id. at 826 (emphasis added) (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972». 
According to Justice Stewart: "[I]n light of the alternative channels of communication 
that are open to prison inmates, we cannot say on the record in this case that this 
restriction on one manner [of communication] is unconstitutional." Id. at 827-28 (em-
phasis added) (footnote omitted). 
184. Id. at 823 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972». 
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for communication with . . . representatives of the news me-
dia."18s Ultimately, the Court in Pell held that "the Constitu-
tion does not ... require government to accord the press special 
access to information not shared by members of the public 
generally." 186 
In Saxbe, the Supreme Court also held that the press has no 
more right of access to information than does the public gener-
ally. In Saxbe, a major metropolitan newspaper challenged the 
constitutionality of one of the policies of the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons. The regulation in question prohibited any personal in-
terviews between reporters and individually designated prison 
inmates. 187 In an opinion written by Justice Stewart, the Court 
noted that the policy under consideration was similar to the one 
in Pel/, 188 and that the "visitation policy does not place the press 
in any less advantageous position than the public generally."189 
Indeed, the Court noted that the Bureau of Prisons' policy pro-
vided journalists more access than that afforded the public gen-
erally in that the policy permitted the press to tour the prisons 
and to photograph prison facilities, and to conduct brief inter-
views with inmates encountered during such tours. 190 
In another case decided by the Supreme Court, Houchins v. 
KQED, Inc., 191 two branches of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and a broadcasting 
company, KQED, filed a complaint for injunctive relief after 
KQED was denied permission to inspect and take photographs 
in a portion of a county jail where a prisoner had committed 
suicide and where prison conditions were allegedly responsible 
for the prisoner's problems. The complaint alleged that the 
county sheriff had violated the First Amendment by refusing to 
permit media access and by failing to provide any effective 
means by which the public could be informed of the conditions 
prevailing at the county jail or learn of the prisoners' griev-
185. Id. at 824-25. However, the Court was quick to note that this was not "an 
attempt by the State to conceal the conditions in its prisons or to frustrate the press' 
investigation and reporting of those conditions." Id. at 830. 
186. Id. at 834 (footnote omitted). 
187. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 844 (1974). 
188. Id. at 846. 
189. Id. at 849. 
190. Id. at 847. 
191. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
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ances. 192 The plaintiffs asserted that public access was essential 
for NAACP members to participate in the public debate regard-
ing jail conditions in the county jail. The plaintiffs further as-
serted that television coverage of the conditions in the cells and 
facilities was the most effective way of informing the public of 
prison conditions. 193 
After considering the evidence, the district court prelimina-
rily enjoined the county sheriff from denying KQED news per-
sonnel and "responsible representatives" of the news media 
access to the prison facilities and from preventing such persons 
from utilizing photographic and sound equipment. In particu-
lar, the district court found that testimony of officials involved 
with other prison facilities indicated that a "more flexible press 
policy" at the county jail was both "desirable and attainable."194 
On interlocutory appeal from the district court's order, the 
county sheriff invoked the Supreme Court's decision in Pel/, ar-
guing that the district court had abused its discretion by order-
ing the county sheriff to give the media greater access to the jail 
than he gave to the general public. Albeit in three separate opin-
ions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the district court's injunction, holding as follows: "Pel! 
v. Procunier does not stand for the proposition that the correla-
tive constitutional rights of the public and the news media to 
visit a prison must be implemented identically. The access needs 
of the news media and the public differ."195 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the question 
presented was whether the news media has a constitutional right 
of access to a county jail, over and above that of other persons, 
to interview inmates and make sound recordings, films, and pho-
tographs for publication and broadcasting by newspapers, radio, 
and television. 196 In a four to three decision, a three-member 
plurality reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, holding that 
under Pel! and Saxbe, the media has no special right of access 
different from that of the general public. 197 According to Chief 
192. Id. at 3-4. 
193. Id. at 4. 
194. Id. at 6-7. 
195. KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 438 U.S. 1 
(1978). 
196. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 3. 
197. Id. at 15-16. 
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Justice Burger's plurality opinion: "The public importance of 
conditions in penal facilities and the media's role of providing 
information afford no basis for reading into the Constitution a 
right of the public or the media to enter these institutions, with 
camera equipment, and take moving and still pictures of inmates 
for broadcast purposes."198 
However, in a decisive concurring opinion, Justice Stewart 
held that "KQED was entitled to injunctive relief of more lim-
ited scope."199 Therefore, under the Supreme Court's "narrow-
est concurrence" rule, it has been asserted that Justice Stewart's 
opinion can, arguably, be viewed as binding precedent.2OO In his 
concurrence, Justice Stewart held that the district court's injunc-
tion was overbroad because it gave the press access to areas and 
sources of information from which persons on the public tours 
had been excluded.201 Although Justice Stewart agreed with 
Chief Justice Burger that the injunction issued by the district 
court was overbroad, he disagreed with the plurality opinion as 
to how the abstract principles set forth in Pell and Saxbe should 
be applied to the facts of the case. In particular, whereas Justice 
Stewart felt that "the concept of equal access must be accorded 
more flexibility in order to accommodate the practical distinc-
198. Id. at 9. Despite this holding, Chief Justice Burger's opinion recognized the 
media's role as the "eyes and ears" of the public. Id. at 8. 
199. Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
200. Philbin, supra note 57, at 147 & n. 95; see Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 8 n.8, 
KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991) No. C90-
1383RHS: 
Given the division of the Court members, Justice Stewart's opinion governs: 
it is the "least common denominator" of the Court's decision. It has long 
been the rule that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five justices, 'the holding 
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.' " 
Id. (citing, among other cases, Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977»; see 
also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-22, at 1529-30 & 
n.33 (2d ed. 1988). 
201. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 18 (Stewart, J., concurring): 
In two respects . . . the District Court's preliminary injunction was over-
broad. It ordered the Sheriff to permit reporters into the [prison] facility and 
it required him to let them interview randomly encountered inmates. In 
both these respects, the injunction gave the press access to areas and sources 
of information from which persons on the public tours had been excluded, 
and thus enlarged the scope of what the Sheriff and Supervisors had opened 
to public view. 
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tions between the press and the general public,"202 Chief Justice 
Burger's plurality opinion viewed "equal access" as meaning ac-
cess that is identical in all respects. 
In addition, Justice Stewart emphasized the critical role 
that the press plays in a democratic society. According to Jus-
tice Stewart: 
When on assignment, a journalist does not tour a jail simply for his 
own edification. He is there to gather information to be passed on 
to others, and his mission is protected by the Constitution for very 
specific reasons. "Enlightened choice by an informed citizenry is 
the basic ideal upon which an open society is premised .... " Our 
society depends heavily on the press for that enlightenment. 
Though not without its lapses, the press "has been a mighty catalyst 
in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing cor-
ruption among public officers and employees and generally inform-
ing the citizenry of public events and occurrences. 
That the First Amendment speaks separately of freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press is no constitutional accident, but an ac-
knowledgment of the critical role played by the press in American 
society. The Constitution requires sensitivity to that role, and to the 
special needs of the press in performing it effectively. A person 
touring Santa Rita jail can grasp its reality with his own eyes and 
ears. But if a television reporter is to convey the jail's sights and 
sounds to those who cannot personally visit the place, he must use 
cameras and sound equipment. In short, terms of access that are 
reasonably imposed on individual members of the public may, if 
they impede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be 
unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to convey to 
the general public what the visitors see.203 
Subsequently, noting that he "would not foreclose the possibility 
of further relief for KQED on remand,"204 Justice Stewart stated 
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments required the county 
sheriff "to give members of the press effective access to the same 
areas" that the general public could already visit.205 In practical 
terms, Justice Stewart approved of the district court's finding 
that "the media required cameras and recording equipment for 
effective presentation to the viewing public of the conditions at 
202. [d. at 16. 
203. [d. at 17 (citations omitted). Justice Stewart's concurring opinion is consis-
tent with his belief that the press serves as a "Fourth Estate," whose function is to 
criticize and question the three official branches of government. See Potter Stewart, 
Or a/the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975). 
204. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 18. 
205. [d. at 17 (emphasis in original). 
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the jail seen by individual visitors, and that their use could be 
kept consistent with institutional needs."206 Indeed, Justice 
Stewart stated that this element of the district court's order was 
"both sanctioned by the Constitution and amply supported by 
the record."207 On remand, the district court implemented Jus-
tice Stewart's proposal; KQED was allowed to use "cameras and 
recording equipment for effective presentation to the viewing 
public . . . . "208 
VI. THE USE OF HISTORY IN CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
While the debate between originalists and nonoriginalists 
continues,209 the United States Supreme Court undeniably 
adopts an historical approach in resolving many constitutional 
issues. Therefore, having already examined the history of public 
executions,210 this Article will examine how the modem Court 
has used an historical framework in previous cases to resolve 
other constitutional issues. Arguing by analogy, this Article ul-
timately concludes that an historical approach, when coupled 
with First and Eighth Amendment principles, mandates that 
private execution laws must be declared unconstitutional. 
A. Death Penalty Cases 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly used an 
historical framework to analyze death penalty issues. In 
Furman v. Georgia 211 and in Gregg v. Georgia,212 for example, 
members of the Supreme Court reviewed the history of the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual" pun-
ishments.213 Noting that the phrase first appeared in the English 
Bill of Rights of 1689,214 the Court emphasized that "capital 
206. Id. at 18. 
207. Id. 
208. Philbin, supra note 57, at 148 (citing Plaintiffs Trial Brief at 9, 10 n.9, 
KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 MEDIA L. REp. (BNA) 2323 (N.D.!Cal. 1991) (No. C90-
1383RHS». 
209. Compare Raoul Berger, Original Intent and Boris Bittker, 66 IND. L.J. 723 
(1991) with Boris 1. Bittker, Observations on Raoul Berger's "Original Intent and Boris 
Bittker," 66 IND. L.J. 757 (1991). 
210. See supra Section II. 
211. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
212. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
213. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 316-28 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
214. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169. 
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punishment was accepted by the Framers. "21S As the Court 
stressed in Gregg: "At the time the Eighth Amendment was rat-
ified, capital punishment was a common sanction in every 
state. "216 
An historical approach has also been utilized in tangential 
areas of death penalty litigation. For instance, in Stanford v. 
Kentucky,217 the Court concluded that sentencing sixteen and 
seventeen-year-old offenders to death did not violate the "evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society."218 However, before even reaching this issue, the Court 
underscored that "[n]either petitioner asserts that his sentence 
constitutes one of 'those modes or acts of punishment that had 
been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of 
Rights was adopted.' "219 
B. Right of Access Cases 
1. Trials 
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia,220 the Anglo-American tradition of open trials was men-
tioned repeatedly throughout the Justices' opinions.221 For 
215. ld. at 177. 
216. ld. 
217. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
218. ld. at 364-80. 
219. ld. at 368 (quoting Ford V. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,405 (1986». TheStan-
ford Court noted that, even if the petitioners had asserted such a claim, they could not 
have supported their contention. In support of the Court's conclusion, Justice Scalia 
stated that, at the time the Bill of Rights was enacted, the common law set the rebutta-
ble presumption of incapacity to commit a felony at age 14 and that capital punish-
ment was theoretically possible for anyone over the age of seven. The Court further 
emphasized that, in accordance with this common law tradition, at least 281 offenders 
under the age of 18 had been executed in the United States. ld. (citations omitted). 
220. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
221. Chief Justice Burger's opinion, joined by Justices White and Stevens, con-
tained several references to history. See, e.g., ide at 564 ("The origins of the proceed-
ing which has become the modern criminal trial in Anglo-American justice can be 
traced back beyond reliable historical records."); ide at 569 ("[T]he historical evidence 
demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were adopted, crim-
inal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open."). 
Several of the concurring opinions in Richmond Newspapers also stressed the im-
portance of history in finding a constitutional right of access. See, e.g., ide at 590 
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("This legacy of open justice was inherited by the English 
settlers in America. The earliest charters of colonial government expressly perpetu-
ated the accepted practice of public trials."); ide at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[I]t 
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example, in Chief Justice Burger's opinion, the history of open 
trials was traced back to "the days before the Norman Con-
quest,"222 with Burger citing such notables as Bentham,223 
Blackstone,224 Pollock22s and Coke.226 Complimenting this ap-
proach, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion described the 
Court's return to history as "a welcome change in direction,"227 
while Justice Brennan's concurring opinion emphasized the im-
portance of "consult[ing] historical and current practice with re-
spect to open trials. "228 
Despite the overwhelming Anglo-American tradition of 
public trials, in Richmond Newspapers, the State of Virginia ar-
gued that neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights contains 
any specific provision protecting the public's right to attend 
criminal trialS.229 Announcing the Court's judgment, Chief Jus-
tice Burger responded to this contention: "Standing alone, this 
is correct, but there remains the question whether, absent an ex-
plicit provision, the Constitution affords protection against ex-
clusion of the public from criminal trialS."230 Concluding that 
"the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of 
the First Amendment,"231 Chief Justice Burger noted that "the 
Court has acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are 
implicit in enumerated guarantees."232 
2. Cameras in the Courtroom 
Because cameras were introduced in the courtroom only re-
has for centuries been a basic presupposition of the Anglo-American legal system that 
trials shall be public trials."); id. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("It is gratifying 
... to see the Court now looking to and relying upon legal history in detennining the 
fundamental public character of the criminal trial.") (citation omitted). 
222. Id. at 565. 
223. Id. at 569. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 565-66. 
226. Id. at 565. 
227. Id. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
228. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
229. Id. at 575. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 580 (footnote omitted). 
232. Id. at 579. Burger listed as such "unarticulated rights" the rights of associa-
tion and privacy, the right to be presumed innocent, the right to be judged by a stan-
dard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case, and the right to travel. Id. 
at 579-80. 
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cently,233 the Supreme Court has had little opportunity to draw 
upon history in handing down its constitutional decisions in this 
area. However, the Court has not been completely silent on this 
matter. For example, in Estes v. Texas,234 the Court noted the 
traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials.235 Starting 
with the proposition that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the 
accused a "public trial," the Court stated that "[b]istory had 
proven that secret tribunals were effective instruments of 
oppression. "236 
Furthermore, since Estes, the Supreme Court has grown 
more tolerant of television's use in judicial proceedings. Most 
notably, the Court backed away from Estes' rigid approach in 
Chandler v. Florida,237 with at least two Justices in Chandler 
suggesting that Estes be overruled.238 Indeed, in tracking the 
technological advances in television since Estes, the Chandler 
majority emphasized that "many of the negative factors found in 
Estes--cumbersome equipment, cables, distracting lighting, nu-
merous technicians-are less substantial factors today than they 
were at that time. "239 
3. Prisons 
The cases of Pell v. Procunier24f) and Saxbe v. Washington 
Post CO.241 contain little mention of history. In Pen although 
the legal issues were fiercely debated, none of the three opinions 
233. According to one commentator, the first televised trial took place in 
Oklahoma City in 1953. Frank, supra note 165, at 756 & n.33. 
234. 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
235. Id. at 539 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-70 (1948». 
236. Id. at 538-39. 
237. 449 U.S. 560 (1981). 
238. [d. at 583 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[R]ather than join what seems to me a 
wholly unsuccessful effort to distinguish [Estes], I would now flatly overrule it."); id. 
at 586-87 (White, J., concurring) ("For the reasons stated by Justice Stewart in his 
concurrence today, I think Estes is fairly read as establishing a per se constitutional 
rule against televising any criminal trial if the defendant objects. So understood, Estes 
must be overruled to affirm the judgment below."). 
239. [d. at 576. Indeed, in Estes, Justice Harlan foreshadowed the Court's holding 
in Chandler. Estes, 381 U.S. at 595 ("[T]he day may come when television will have 
become so commonplace an affair in the daily life of the average person as to dissipate 
all reasonable likelihood that its use in courtrooms may disparage the judicial 
process. "). 
240. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
241. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
Number 3] TELEVISED EXECUTIONS 397 
in the case mentioned the history of prison visitation rights. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart was content in stating 
that it is a "familiar proposition" that incarceration compels 
" 'the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and 
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our 
penal system.' "242 In Saxbe, visitation rights again received no 
attention, with Justice Powell merely noting in dissent that 
"[t]he history of our prisons is in large measure a chronicle of 
public indifference and neglect. "243 
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, the Supreme Court distinguished the Pell and Saxbe cases 
on the grounds that those cases "were concerned with penal in-
stitutions which, by definition, are not 'open' or public 
places."244 According to the Court, "Penal institutions do not 
share the long tradition of openness, although traditionally there 
have been visiting committees of citizens, and there is no doubt 
that legislative committees could exercise plenary oversight and 
'visitation rights.' "245 
VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TELEVISED EXECUTIONS 
As noted by judges and commentators, private execution 
statutes raise several constitutional issues. First, current statu-
tory schemes raise First Amendment concerns, including the ap-
plication of right of access, content regulation and prior restraint 
jurisprudence. Second, from a radio or television reporter's per-
spective, because some private execution statutes arguably favor 
print journalists over broadcast journalists, such statutes can im-
plicate Equal Protection concerns. Finally, from an inmate's 
perspective, right of privacy issues also could arise if a state au-
thorized a televised execution. 
Highlighting each of these constitutional concerns, this Ar-
ticle will discuss the constitutionality of the private execution 
statutes currently in effect. Although this Article concludes that 
242. Pell, 417 U.s. at 822 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)). 
243. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 861 n.7 (powell, J., dissenting). 
244. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 550, 576 n.ll (1980). 
245. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he early penal reform move-
ments in this country and England gained impetus as a result of reports from citizens 
and visiting committees who volunteered or received commissions to visit penal insti-
tutions and make reports." Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. I, 12-13 (1978). 
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private execution statutes are unconstitutional, this Article finds 
that it is the history of public executions - coupled with the 
application of First Amendment principles and the jurispru-
dence of Trop v. Dulles 246 - that requires the Supreme Court to 
invalidate private execution statutes. 
A. First Amendment Analysis 
1. Prior Restraint 
The prior restraint doctrine probably originated as an at-
tempt to prohibit the practice of sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
tury English licensing systems under which all printers were 
required to gain the approval of state or church officials before 
publishing books or pamphlets. 247 The doctrine was first in-
voked by the Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota, 248 in which a 
state scheme for abating scandalous or defamatory newspapers 
was held unconstitutional.249 In general, the prior restraint doc-
trine concerns governmental actions prohibiting the publication 
of previously obtained information.250 The Supreme Court's 
preference for subsequent sanctions was best articulated by Chief 
Justice Burger in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart:25 1 "A 
prior restraint ... has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If 
it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after 
pUblication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for 
the time. "252 
On the issue of public executions, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
246. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
247. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931); GEOFFREY R. STONE, 
LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK D. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1131 (2d ed. 1991); TRIBE, supra note 200, § 12-34. See generally Thomas I. 
Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 648 
(1955); William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions 
of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 
CORNELL L. REV. 245,247-49 (1982). 
248. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
249. Id. For a discussion of Near, see Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior 
Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 15-19 (1981). 
250. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976) (the first amend-
ment provides "special protection against orders that prohibit the publication or 
broadcast of particular information or commentary-orders that impose a 'previous' 
or 'prior' restraint"). 
251. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
252. [d. at 559. 
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Appeals in Ga"ett v. Estelle 253 rejected a prior restraint argu-
ment in one terse paragraph: 
[A]micus suggests that the proposed simultaneous closed circuit tel-
ecast is a "publication" and that to prohibit its use in any way, such 
as by filming, is an illegal prior restraint on republication. This sug-
gestion is similar to the argument made by Garrett that once he is 
given access to information by the government, here by closed cir-
cuit telecast, the government may not limit the use Garrett may 
make of the information, such as filming it. But the access granted 
to Garrett and the other members of the press is limited. Access for 
the purpose of filming is not provided, and the first amendment does 
not require that it be provided.254 
However, at least one commentator has argued that the 
prior restraint doctrine is applicable in the context of public 
executions: 
[T]o say that prior restraint is eschewed only with respect to publi-
cation of news, but not to news gathering, is to ignore that the latter 
in most cases precedes the former, and that in cases like Ga"ett 
both are content-related. It takes little imagination to understand 
that, as long as the objective is to suppress publication because of its 
content, there is little difference between situations in which the 
government first allows the cameraman to film the event and then 
takes his film away, and those in which the government merely pre-
vents him from filming altogether; the result is the same and only 
the means have been changed.255 
Despite this poignant attempt to apply the prior restraint 
doctrine to restrictions on the filming of executions, this argu-
ment stretches the doctrine too far. Although the prior restraint 
doctrine has been used to eliminate numerous types of govern-
ment censorship,256 the doctrine has never embraced news-
gathering.257 In Pell v. Procunier, 258 for example, the Supreme 
253. 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977). 
254. Id. at 1279. 
255. Comment, supra note 80, at 749 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). 
256. The prior restraint doctrine has been applied "to void procedurally inade-
quate schemes of government censorship of films, books, and plays; to strike down 
overbroad permit requirements; and to invalidate discriminatory taxes on the press." 
TruBE, supra note 200, § 12-34, at 1039-40 (footnotes omitted). 
257. See Emerson, supra note 247, at 655-56 (listing four types of prior restraints, 
none of which includes newsgathering activities); see also Paul G. Cassell, Restrictions 
on Press Coverage of Military Operations: The Right of Access, Grenada, and "Off-the-
Record Wars," 73 GEO. L.J. 931, 949 (1985) ("Prior restraint analysis is not particu-
larly helpful ... in considering whether the Constitution requires press access to mili-
tary operations."). As Cassell argues in the context of military operations, "[d]enying 
the press access to military operations . . . does not forbid the publication of any 
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Court stated: 
It is one thing to say ... that government cannot restrain the publi-
cation of news emanating from [certain] sources .... It is quite 
another thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon govern-
ment the affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of 
information not available to members of the public generally.259 
Likewise, in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,260 the Supreme Court 
held that where a pretrial exclusion order did not prevent the 
press "from publishing any information in its possession," the 
proper inquiry was whether the press has been denied any con-
stitutional right of access.261 Thus, because the prior restraint 
doctrine only prohibits the government from suppressing infor-
mation already in the hands of journalists and private parties, 
the prior restraint doctrine is not an effective tool with which to 
attack private execution statutes. 
2. Content Regulation 
With its roots in the 1930s and 194Os, the "content distinc-
tion" in First Amendment jurisprudence has emerged as a fix-
ture in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny for laws 
regulating speech.262 "Content-based" restrictions limit expres-
sion based on the message they convey. Examples of such re-
strictions are laws that prohibit seditious libel, ban the 
publication of confidential information, or outlaw the display of 
swastikas in certain neighborhoods. "Content-neutral" restric-
tions limit communication without regard to the content or 
communicative impact of the message conveyed. Laws that pro-
hibit noisy speeches near hospitals, ban billboards in residential 
communities, or forbid the distribution of pamphlets in public 
infonnation; rather it prevents the press and the public from obtaining infonnation." 
Id. at 950 (footnote omitted). 
258. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
259. Id. at 834. 
260. 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
261. Id. at 393 n.25. 
262. See Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 189, 189 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation]; Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 46 (1987) [hereinafter 
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions]; Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and 
Content Discrimination. 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 214-31 (1982); Note, The Content Dis-
tinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1904 (1989). 
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places are illustrations of content-neutral regulations.263 While 
content-based restrictions receive strict scrutiny,264 content-neu-
tral regulations are reviewed under several varied standards.265 
Because private execution statutes focus on preventing the 
subsequent broadcast of an execution, it has been argued that 
such restrictions impermissibly regulate content.266 Not only is 
this view in accord with libertarian principles of the First 
Amendment, it is consistent with Supreme Court precedent as 
well.267 For example, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mos-
ley,268 the United States Supreme Court held that regulations en-
acted for the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of 
content presumptively violate the First Amendment.269 Accord-
ing to the Mosley Court: 
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has 
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content. . .. To permit the continued building 
of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each 
individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any 
thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this for-
bidden censorship is content control. Any restriction on expressive 
activity because of its content would completely undercut the 
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.'>270 
Indeed, members of the Supreme Court have also recognized the 
importance of television in conveying news to the general public. 
263. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 262, at 47-48; Stone, Content 
Regulation, supra note 262, at 189-90. 
264. Content-based restrictions are subject to "the most exacting scrutiny." Texas 
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,412 (1989) (citing Boos v. Barry, 485' U.S. 312, 321 (1988». 
To withstand such scrutiny, such restrictions will only be upheld if they are the least 
restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental interest. Sable Com-
munications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. 
265. See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 262, at 48. As recently as 
1987, Geoffrey Stone identified seven such standards of review, ranging from a highly 
deferential standard to a strict level of scrutiny. See id. at 48-54 (discussing the seven 
standards). 
266. Comment, supra note 80, at 747-48. 
267. See id. 
268. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
269. Id. at 95, 98-99; see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 
41,46-47 (1986); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 & n.7 (1980). Restrictions on 
the content of first amendment expression may be justified only if a substantial govern-
mental interest is found to exist. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92. 
270. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96 (citations omitted) (quoting New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964». 
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As Justice Powell noted in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co., 271 the public is the "loser" when news coverage is 
limited to "watered-down verbal reporting, perhaps with an oc-
casional still picture."272 According to Justice Powell, "This is 
hardly the kind of news reportage that the First Amendment is 
meant to foster."273 
In Garrett, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit only briefly discussed content regulation. According to 
the court: 
In order to sustain Garrett's argument we would have to find that 
the moving picture of the actual execution possessed some quality 
giving it "content" beyond, for example, that possessed by a simula-
tion of the execution. We discern no such quality from the record 
or from our inferences therein. Despite the unavailability of film of 
the actual execution the public can be fully informed; the free flow 
of ideas and information need not be inhibited.274 
However, in addressing content regulation so hastily, the 
Garrett court overlooked several important points. First, there 
271. 433 u.s. 562 (1977). 
272. ld. at 581 (powell, J., dissenting). 
273. ld.; see also Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (noting the unique 
features of television in reversing a criminal conviction because of a televised confes-
sion); Cable News Network v. American Broadcasting Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 
(N.D. Ga. 1981): 
Many citizens likely rely on television as their sole source of news. Further, 
visual impressions can and sometimes do add a material dimension to one's 
impression of particular news events. Television film coverage of the news 
provides a comprehensive visual element and an immediacy, or simultaneous 
aspect, not found in print media . . .. [T]he importance of conveying the 
fullest information possible increases as the importance of the particular 
news event or news setting increases. 
Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 576, 578 (D. 
Utah 1985) (citation omitted) (holding that there is a first amendment right of access 
to traditionally open administrative hearings and finding that furnishing a transcript is 
no substitute for television coverage): 
The press and public are denied access to unfiltered information while it is 
still fresh. A stale transcript is not an adequate substitute for access to the 
hearings themselves. Emotions, gestures, facial expressions, and pregnant 
pauses do not appear on the reported transcript. Much of what makes good 
news is lost in the difference between a one-dimensional transcript and an 
opportunity to see and hear testimony as it unfolds. 
People v. Thompson, 50 Ca1.3d 134, 182, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990) (noting 
that some events in the criminal process are "simply indescribable in mere words" and 
require photographic presentation); cf. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555, 573, 577 
n.l2 (1980) (noting that people acquire information about the criminal process 
"chiefly through the print and electronic media"). 
274. Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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is a qualitative difference between watching an actual execution 
and a simulated execution. Watching a simulation of President 
Kennedy's assassination, for example, would not evoke the same 
emotions for many as watching the actual film footage. Because 
private execution laws, by definition, affect the "communicative 
impact" of the message journalists are able to convey, such con-
tent-based regulations must be struck down as unconstitu-
tional.275 In fact, with television stations in the United States 
already broadcasting assassinations and executions in other 
countries, including executions in Iraq, Romania, Saudi Arabia 
and Vietnam,276 it is ironic and contrary to First Amendment 
principles that executions performed by our own government are 
deemed inappropriate for television audiences in the United 
States. Second, in addressing the issue of content regulation, the 
Garrett court ignored the fact that producing simulations is ex-
pensive and time-consuming. Indeed, if television stations are 
forced to produce their own execution simulations, political 
speech may be chilled. In this regard, the case of Minneapolis 
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue 277 is 
instructive. There, a state use tax assessed a tax on the costs of 
275. Televised executions would provide more reliable and accurate information 
about such events than eyewitness accounts. For example, the newspaper accounts of 
one execution indicates that the reporters had widely different versions of whether the 
condemned prisoner had to be wrestled into the execution chamber and what exactly 
the condemned prisoner said. While one report had the prisoner insanely shouting "I 
am Jesus Christ," another report had the prisoner resignedly muttering "Oh, my Jesus 
Christ." Other recollections also differed with the newspaper accounts. See Plaintiff's 
Post-Trial Brief at 22-23 & n.18, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 
2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (No. C90-1383RHS); see also Angeja, supra note 124, at 1500 
("A television image can convey exactly what a spectator would see if she were pres-
ent within the execution chamber."); Richards & Easter, supra note 57, at 403 (foot-
note omitted) ("no simulation can provide precisely the same content (e.g., 
expressions on the face of the condemned) as the actual event"); MARSHALL 
McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7 (1964) ("the me-
dium is the message"); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 
(1985) ("The use of illustrations or pictures in advertisements serves important com-
municative functions: it attracts the attention of the audience to the advertiser's 
message, and it may also serve to impart information directly. Accordingly, commer-
cial illustrations are entitled to the First Amendment protections afforded verbal com-
mercial speech .... "). 
276. Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 24, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 
2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (No. C90-1383RHS). Television broadcasts of assassinations 
have included, among others, John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, Martin Luther 
King, Jr., and Lee Harvey Oswald. [d. 
277. 460 U.S. 575 (1983). 
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the ink and paper used in producing publications.278 However, 
because a provision exempted the first $100,000 worth of ink and 
paper, the law as applied affected only a handful of the state's 
largest newspapers.279 While the Supreme Court found no evi-
dence that the state legislature was attempting to impermissibly 
regulate the content of the papers,280 the Court subjected the law 
to strict scrutiny and held that the provision was unconstitu-
tional under the First Amendment.281 The Court stated, "A tax 
that singles out the press, or that targets individual publications 
within the press, places a heavy burden on the State to justify its 
action. "282 Thus, if television stations are required to produce 
their own execution simulations in order to attempt to commu-
nicate their message, private execution statutes are unconstitu-
tional as applied to television stations.283 
The asserted justifications for private execution statutes 
clearly indicate that such regulations are "content-based." For 
instance, prison officials often express concerns about the impact 
of televised executions on inmates and other television viewers, 
including the fear that pictures of an execution will reveal the 
identity of witnesses or prison officials. Because these alleged 
concerns relate in toto to the communicative impact of televised 
broadcasts, private execution laws are obviously concerned with 
the regulation of the content of speech.284 
278. [d. at 578. 
279. [d. at 578-79. 
280. See id. at 592. 
281. See id. at 591. According to the Court: "Whatever the motive of the legisla-
ture in this case, we think that recognizing a power in the State not only to single out 
the press but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press 
presents such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify 
the scheme." [d. at 591-92. 
282. [d. at 592-93. 
283. Accord Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (a 
sales tax that exempted certain classes of magazines was held unconstitutional); Board 
of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982) (recognizing a student's right of access 
to certain books in a high school library where the school board didn't ban the use of 
such books, but forced students to take the more expensive and less convenient route 
of acquiring the books from sources other than the school library); Grosjean v. Ameri-
can Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (a license tax upon advertising receipts based on a 
newspaper's circulation was held unconstitutional because it attempted to limit the 
dissemination of information by placing a tax upon a select group of newspapers). 
284. See Angeja, supra note 124, at 1506 (footnote omitted) ("Since cameras are 
allowed into prisons to televise other events, only the content oftelevised broadcasts of 
executions differentiates regulations concerning this particular use of the camera."). 
',1\ 
- ,'d 
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Because states can assert only "sham" interests to justify 
private execution statutes/8S such statutes must be declared un-
constitutional. On the issue of prison security, for example, 
states have asserted that prison riots may occur or that prison 
staff or their families may be attacked or harassed by inmates or 
others who view an execution film. However, the presence of a 
camera in the execution chamber will not jeopardize prison se-
curity.286 First, given that prisoners can be confined to their 
cells during an execution, the possibility that prison riots will 
occur during executions is pure speculation.287 Second, fears 
that prison employees may be attacked or threatened assumes 
that an execution film will record the faces of prison personnel. 
However, as the plaintiffs suggested in KQED, less restrictive al-
ternatives to address this concern include, inter alia, the use of 
"electronic masking" or screening prior to an execution film be-
ing broadcast or instructing a camera operator not to tum the 
camera on until the condemned person has been strapped into 
the gas chamber chair and the officers are out of sight.2BB "Addi-
tionally, since television sets are conditionally provided to the 
285. States may not offer "sham" justifications for a restriction on free speech. 
Thus, it has been held that a regulation affecting free speech rights is unconstitutional 
if "it does not sufficiently serve those public interests that are urged as its justifica-
tion." United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 181 (1983); see also Greer v. Spack, 424 
U.S. 828, 843 (1976) (powell, J., concurring) ("any significant restriction of First 
Amendment freedoms carries a heavy burden of justification"); Heffron v. Interna-
tional Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 658 (1981) (the burden of 
justifying a regulation affecting first amendment freedoms is on the government). 
286. "[I]t is unclear how viewing the inside of the private execution chamber jeop-
ardizes prison security and safety-particularly if members of the press and public 
already have been granted physical access to the chamber." Tao, supra note 80, at 
1076 (footnote omitted). 
287. First amendment restrictions can withstand constitutional scrutiny only 
where the danger is "likely" and "imminent." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 
447 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
288. See Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 19-21, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. 
(BNA) 2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (No. C90-1383RHS); see also Richards & Easter, supra 
note 57, at 411-12 (noting other alternatives that would be more "narrowly tailored" 
to serve the interests of prison security). In the challenge to California's private exe-
cution statute, there was substantial evidence that the real reasons for excluding televi-
sion cameras from the execution chamber had nothing to do with prison security. See 
Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief at 23-24, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. 2323 
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (No. C90-1383RHS) (witnesses gave the following reasons for not 
allowing public executions: "dignity," "don't want this turned into a circus," 
"thought it was not an appropriate item for public viewing," and "wouldn't be in good 
taste"). 
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inmate population, restrictions could easily be levied on their 
use."289 A state's allegation, such as in the KQED case, that a 
camera may be thrown at the execution chamber glass is clearly 
a sham, as a camera easily could be bolted to the floor.290 Like-
wise, regardless of whether protecting children from watching 
an execution is a legitimate governmental concern,291 restricting 
the broadcast time of an execution is a less restrictive alternative 
than banning the broadcast altogether.292 
That the real purpose of private execution laws is to prevent 
the general public from hearing about the details of executions is 
reinforced by several state statutes, which provide that execu-
tions only be conducted during the middle of the night or that 
the details of executions not be published at all. For example, in 
Louisiana, every execution is to take place between the hours of 
midnight and 3:00 a.m.293 Likewise, in South Dakota, where ex-
ecutions can only take place between the hours of 12:01 a.m. and 
6:00 a.m.,294 the statute makes it a misdemeanor for persons in-
289. Philbin, supra note 57, at 154 (footnote omitted). According to KQED's trial 
brief: "The fact that the defendant chooses to allow prisoners to have television sets, 
and apparently is unwilling to disconnect them when he thinks a particular program 
may be problematical, cannot justify blacking out the entire general public." This 
position, KQED asserted, would allow the "prisoner tail ... [to] wag the First 
Amendment dog." Plaintifrs Post-Trial Reply Brief at 8, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 
Media L. Rep. (N.D. Cal. 1991) (No. C90-1383RHS). 
290. See Plaintifrs Post-Trial Brief at 23, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. 
Rep. 2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (No. C90-1383RHS). 
291. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Supreme Court held that 
the government's interest in the "well-being of its youth" and in supporting "parents' 
claim to authority in their own household" justified the regulation of otherwise pro-
tected expression. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978); Interstate 
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968). However, it is well-settled 
that "the government may not 'reduce the adult population ... to ... only what is fit 
for children.''' Sable Communications v. Federal Communications Commission, 492 
U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 
(1983)). 
292. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 
(1980) (a restriction which regulates "the time, place, or manner" of speech may be 
imposed so long as it is reasonable and so long as the restriction serves "a significant 
governmental interest" and leaves "ample alternative channels for communication"); 
cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 & n.28 (1978) (emphasizing the "nar-
rowness of [its] holding" and refusing to reach the issue of whether a broadcast late in 
the evening could be constitutionally prohibited, five members of the Supreme Court 
held that an FCC order that prohibited an early afternoon radio broadcast of a 12-
minute monologue entitled "Filthy Words" did not violate the first amendment). 
293. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:569.1 (West 1992). 
294. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-17 (1988). 
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vited to attend the execution to disclose the exact time of the 
execution.29s Indeed, in Arkansas, it is unlawful for an individ-
ual to merely print or publish details of an execution.296 Un-
doubtedly, such laws, on their face, impermissibly regulate the 
content of speech.297 
Although the Supreme Court has expressed an unwilling-
ness to strike down statutes on the basis of illicit legislative mo-
tives,298 it is well-established that "regulations enacted for the 
purpose of restraining speech on the basis of its content pre-
sumptively violate the First Amendment."299 Because private 
execution laws remain in place for the paternalistic reasons for 
which they were originally enacted, such regulations presump-
tively violate the First Amendment. In this regard, it is signifi-
cant that the Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to 
invalidate "sham" laws enacted for an "avowed" constitutional 
purpose.300 
However, regardless of whether private execution statutes 
295. ld. at § 23A-27A-37 (1988). 
296. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
297. It is well-established that "the First Amendment forbids the government from 
regulating speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of 
others." City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984). Indeed, a 
regulation is considered content-based if it seeks to eliminate debate on an entire issue, 
even if the regulation does not" 'favor either side of a controversy.''' Boos v. Barry, 
485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (plurality) (quoting Consolidated Edison, Co. v. Public Servo 
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980». 
298. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986) (citing 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86 (1968». But see Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1988) (citation omitted) ("The principal inquiry in deter-
mining content-neutrality, in speech cases generally, and in time, place, or manner in 
particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation because of disagree-
ment with the message it conveys. The government's purpose is the controlling 
consideration."). 
299. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-
63 & n.7 (1980) and Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 98-99 
(1972». 
300. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (Kentucky statute requiring the 
posting of copies of the Ten Commandments in public schools violated the establish-
ment clause of the first amendment despite the fact that the statute's "avowed" pur-
pose was "secular and not religious"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 
(1987) ("While the Court is normally deferential to a state's articulation of a secular 
purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not a 
sham."); cJ. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (at-large election system unconsti-
tutional where trial court evidence supported finding of intentional discrimination); 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1988) (emphasis added) ("The 
government's purpose is the controlling consideration" in first amendment analysis.) 
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are considered "content-based" or "content-neutral,"301 the 
Supreme Court should find such laws unconstitutional because 
such regulations violate the court's anti-paternalistic under-
standing of the First Amendment and assume that the govern-
ment knows best.302 Thus, private execution statutes violate the 
Supreme Court's First Amendment understanding that "infor-
mation is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their 
own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and 
that the best means to that end is to open the channels of com-
munication rather than to close them."303 Furthermore, the en-
forcement of private execution statutes runs contrary to the 
Court's observation in First Nat'/ Bank of Boston v. Bellotti:304 
"[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsi-
bility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting 
arguments ... [and] if there be any danger that the people can-
not evaluate the information and arguments . . . it is a danger 
contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment. "305 As 
the Supreme Court recently reiterated, "[A] principal 'function 
of free speech under our system of government is to invite dis-
301. Philbin, supra note 57, at 153 ("In the cases examined thus far, the states have 
successfully argued that [media tool] restrictions were not content-based, but were 
instead content-neutral restrictions grounded in security and privacy concerns."). 
302. See Stone, Content Regulation. supra note 262, at 212-14. 
303. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
U.S. 748, 770 (1976); see also Benjamin Lombard, Note, First Amendment Limits on 
the Use of Taxes to Subsidize Selectively the Media. 78 CORNELL L. REV. 106, 125 
("The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to receive information and 
ideas as a necessary corollary to the right to speak.") (emphasis added); Richards & 
Easter, supra note 57, at 393 n. 59 (citing cases finding a right to receive information). 
The "right to receive" information has been extended to "personal correspondence, 
political and religious material, commercial information, pornography, and informa-
tion and ideas generally." Michael J. Hayes, Note, What Ever Happened to "The 
Right to Know"?: Access to Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond 
Newspapers, 73 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (1987) (footnotes omitted). Even when con-
tent-neutral regulations are subjected to "rational basis" review, such regulations must 
leave open alternative methods of disseminating the relevant information. See Consol-
idated Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980); Lloyd Corp. v. 
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 556-67 & n.12 (1972). 
304. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
305. Id. at 791-92; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,24 (1971) ("The con-
stitutional right of free expression is ... intended to remove governmental restraints 
from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be 
voiced largely into the hands of each of us . . . in the belief that no other approach 
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our 
political system rests."). 
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pute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a 
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as 
they are, or even stirs people to anger.' "306 Thus, "[i]f there is a 
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."307 
3. Right of Access 
In the landmark decision of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Commonwealth of Virginia. 308 the Supreme Court recognized the 
public's First Amendment right to attend criminal trials. In that 
case, Chief Justice Burger observed that it is not crucial whether 
the right to attend criminal trials is described as a "right of ac-
cess" or a "right to gather information."309 For, as Burger noted 
in his plurality opinion, the Court has "recognized that 'without 
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press 
could be eviscerated.' "310 Moreover, the rights "to speak and to 
publish concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much 
meaning if access to observe the trial could . . . be foreclosed 
arbitrarily. "311 
Since Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged a broader right of access to gather information. In 
1982, for example, the Court in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court 312 considered a challenge to a statute allowing automatic 
trial closure for sexual offense cases involving minor victims.313 
Recognizing that the right to attend criminal trials is not abso-
306. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1989) (quoting Terminiello v. Chi-
cago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949». Notably, in Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988), 
where a law prohibiting the display of picketing signs within a certain distance of 
foreign embassies was struck down, the Supreme Court reiterated its " 'long-standing 
refusal' " to punish speech because the particular speech may have" 'an adverse emo-
tional impact on the audience.'" ld. at 322 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988». For a detailed discussion of the "secondary effects" 
doctrine in the context of televised executions, see Tao, supra note 80, at 1073-75. 
Also, for a discussion of "conduct," as opposed to "speech," in the context ofte1evised 
executions, see id. at lO72-73. 
307. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
308. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
309. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576. 
310. ld. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972». 
311. ld. at 576-77 (footnote omitted). 
312. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
313. ld. at 598 n.l. 
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lute, the Court discussed the right of access in terms of its histor-
ical roots and its vital role in the judicial process.314 Ultimately, 
the Court concluded that where a state "attempts to deny the 
right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive infor-
mation, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a 
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest."31s While the Court agreed that the state has 
a compelling interest in safeguarding victims from additional 
trauma, the Court held that the mandatory closure rule was too 
restrictive and thus violative of the First Amendment.316 
In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,317 the Supreme 
Court also broadened the right to gather information. In that 
case, the Court held that the guarantees of open public proceed-
ings cover proceedings for the voir dire examination of potential 
jurors. Citing the importance of history utilized in Richmond 
Newspapers, the Court in Press-Enterprise also used historical ev-
idence in concluding that juries have traditionally been selected 
in public.31s Indeed, the Court concluded that the presumption 
of openness could only be overcome by a compelling state inter-
est that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.319 
Lower courts have also extended the rationale of Richmond 
Newspapers into other areas. For example, in Westmoreland v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 320 and Publicker Industries, 
Inc. v. Cohen, 321 the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sec-
314. [d. at 605-06. 
315. [d. at 606-07. 
316. [d. at 607-11. Emphasizing that cases must be resolved on a case-by-case 
basis, the Court spoke in the following terms: 
In individual cases, and under appropriate circumstances, the First Amend-
ment does not necessarily stand as a bar to the exclusion from the courtroom 
of the press and general public during the testimony of minor sex-olfense 
victims. But a mandatory rule, requiring no particularized determinations 
in individual cases, is unconstitutional. 
[d. at 611 n.27. 
317. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
318. The Press-Enterprise Court traced the jury selection process back to the Nor-
man Conquest and noted that "[p]ublic jury selection ... was the common practice in 
America when the Constitution was adopted." [d. at 505-08. 
319. [d. at 510; see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) 
(holding that the public has a right of access to preliminary hearings). 
320. 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985). 
321. 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984). The Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have 
also held that a right of access exists to civil proceedings. See generally Westmoreland 
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 
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ond and Third Circuits held that there is a constitutional right of 
access to attend civil trials. In short, civil proceedings have been 
held to implicate the same First Amendment rights as criminal 
trialS.322 Once again, the presumption of openness can only be 
overcome by an overriding governmental interest and a lack of 
viable alternatives. 
Because executions have historically been open to the gen-
eral public, the public has a constitutional right of access to at-
tend executions. Not only does allowing such access "protect 
the free discussion of governmental affairs,"323 but it also ensures 
that individual citizens can effectively participate and contribute 
to the American system of self-government.324 Indeed, as the 
Court articulated in Richmond Newspapers. Inc. v. Common-
wealth of Virginia. 325 "To work effectively, it is important that 
society'S criminal process 'satisfy the appearance of justice,' and 
the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing peo-
ple to observe it."326 As the Court continued, "People in an 
open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, 
but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited 
from observing."327 
Furthermore, a constitutional right of access to attend ex-
ecutions should not be inhibited merely because such events 
(1985); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FrC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). 
322. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1067-71. As the Third Circuit stated: 
From the foregoing discussion it becomes clear that the public and the press 
possess a First Amendment and a common law right of access to civil pro-
ceedings; indeed, there is a presumption that these proceedings will be open. 
The trial court may limit this right, however, when an important counter-
vailing interest is shown. 
lei. at 1071. 
323. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). Protecting the free discussion of 
governmental affairs was cited by the Globe Newspaper Court as being an underlying 
purpose of the first amendment right of access to criminal trials. Globe Newspaper 
Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982). 
324. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980); 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.s. 88, 95 (1940). 
325. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
326. lei. at 571-72 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (citation 
omitted». 
327. lei. at 572. Information about the criminal justice system is "of critical impor-
tance to our type of government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper 
conduct of public business." Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.s. 469, 495 
(1975). 
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were privatized over the course of the last 150 years. Consider-
ing the centuries' old practice of public executions in Europe and 
the well-established tradition of public executions in the United 
States before the 1830s and unti11937,328 this amount of time is 
de minimis. Indeed, especially considering the fact that televi-
sion and radio are modern technologies, it would be illogical to 
punish modern day litigants on the ground that previous genera-
tions failed to challenge private execution statutes until the 
1970s in Garrett v. Estelle. 329 In short, states should not be dealt 
a "constitutional waiver" trump card just because the well-estab-
lished practice of public executions was changed in the United 
States during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.330 
However, all of this is not to suggest that executions must 
now be conducted in Central Park or downtown Dallas. Given 
modern day technology, broadcast journalists - acting as surro-
gates for the people - can easily film executions and transmit 
the footage to American households via videotape or television. 
Thus, whereas physical space limitations might have posed 
problems in the past, the advent of television and video technol-
ogy allows government officials to continue conducting execu-
tions in prisons while allowing the general public to "witness" 
the event. However, "[i]n such situations, representatives of the 
press must be assured access."331 Televising executions will al-
low the general public to debate, in a real way, the morality of 
capital punishment. 332 
328. See supra Section II. 
329. 424 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977). 
330. See supra Section II. Notably, one commentator has argued that "history 
does not demonstrate an unbroken tradition of press and public access to executions" 
and that this conclusion "precludes a finding that executions 'historically harvel been 
open to the press and general public.''' Dave A. Drobny, Note, Death TV: Media 
Access to Executions Under the First Amendment, 70 WASH U. L.Q. 1179, 1201-02 
(1992) (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982». How-
ever, what this commentator fails to recognize is that even modern-day private execu-
tion statutes generally allow for the attendance of some members of the public. See 
supra notes 66-72 (citing several statutes that mandate the attendance of a certain 
number of "reputable" citizens). Thus, the general public has never been truly barred 
from execution proceedings. 
331. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 600 n.3. 
332. Cj. Times Publishing Co. v. Florida, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1861, 1863 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (Florida Department of Corrections emergency rule canceling all 
regularly scheduled interviews with condemned prisoners until death warrant "is exe-
cuted, expires, or is stayed," is invalid as applied to particular prisoner whose death 
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B. Equal Protection Analysis 
In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley333 the Supreme 
Court held that the Equal Protection clause requires that stat-
utes affecting First Amendment interests be narrowly tailored to 
their legitimate objectives.334 In practice, however, the Supreme 
Court has both embraced33s and eschewed336 reliance on the 
Equal Protection clause when deciding First Amendment issues. 
This has led one scholar to remark that "[i]nvocation of the 
equal protection clause" may only "deflect attention" from the 
central First Amendment issue.337 Thus, although courts have 
held that governmental entities cannot deny access to some 
members of the press while granting access to others,338 such 
Equal Protection cases may only distract from the more funda-
mental "content regulation" issue that private execution statutes 
raise. 
warrant is outstanding, because interviews with condemned prisoners whose deaths 
are imminent are "uniquely of interest to a public which continues to debate the mo-
rality of capital punishment"). 
An individual's "right to know" originates with "the widely accepted principle 
that the core value protected by the first amendment is the citizen's right to participate 
in America's representative democracy." Hayes., supra note 303, at 1113; see also 
Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. 
REsEARCH J. 521, 593 (freedom of expression acts as a watchdog of the government). 
The framers of the Constitution explicitly recognized the important role that access to 
information plays in a representative democracy. See Bill for the More General Diffu-
sion of Knowledge (T. Jefferson) in 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 220-21 
(paul L. Ford ed., 1893) ("[W]hereas ... experience hath shewn, that even under the 
best forms, those entrusted with power have, in time ... perverted it into tyranny; and 
it is belieVed that the most effectual means of preventing this would be, to illuminate, 
as far as practicable, the minds of the people at large .... "); Letter from James 
Madison to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gail-
lard Hunt ed., 1910) ("A popular government, without popular information or the 
means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both. 
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own 
governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."). 
333. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
334. ld. at 101. 
335. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
336. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980). 
337. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 262, at 206. 
338. See, e.g., Quad-City Community News Service, Inc. v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8, 
15 (S.D. Iowa 1971) ("Defendants' denial of access by Quad-City to records available 
to the other media presents an obvious case of denial of equal protection of the law in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution."). 
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In comparing the areas of content regulation and Equal 
Protection, it has been argued that the notion of equality "lies at 
the heart of the First Amendment's protections against govern-
mental regulation of the content of speech."339 Indeed, accord-
ing to the Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, 
Geoffrey Stone, there is an obvious connection between the con-
cept of equality and the "content-based" /"content-neutral" dis-
tinction. For, when government restricts only certain ideas or 
items of information, people wishing to articulate the restricted 
viewpoint or information receive "unequal" treatment.34O How-
ever, as Stone points out, there are dangers in emphasizing 
equality. "By focusing on equality," Stone writes, "the Court 
may invite government to 'equalize,' not by permitting more 
speech, but by adopting even more 'suppressive' content-neutral 
restrictions. "341 Obviously, the attempt by California officials in 
KQED to prohibit all journalists from witnessing the execution 
of Robert Alton Harris illustrates the danger of Equal Protec-
tion challenges to private execution statutes. 342 
C. Right of Privacy Analysis 
In his 1928 dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 343 Justice 
Louis Brandeis defined the constitutional right of privacy as "the 
right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the 
right most valued by civilized men. "344 As Laurence Tribe 
339. Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 
U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 21 (1975). According to Karst, "[j]ust as the prohibition of 
government-imposed discrimination on the basis of race is central to equal protection 
analysis, protection against governmental discrimination on the basis of speech con-
tent is central among first amendment values." Id. at 35. 
340. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 262, at 202. 
341. Id. at 205; see also Roy A. Black, Case Comment, Equal But Inadequate Pr0-
tection: A Look at Mosley and Grayned, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 469 (1973) (criti-
cizing the reliance on equal protection analysis in first amendment cases). 
342. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text. But cJ. Smith v. Daily Mail 
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (a West Virginia statute prohibiting newspapers 
from publishing the name of a juvenile offender was unconstitutional because it ap-
plied to newspapers alone); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989) (emphasis 
added) ("When a state attempts the extraordinary measure of punishing truthful pub-
lication in the name of privacy, it must demonstrate its commitment to advancing this 
interest by applying its prohibition evenhandedly, to the smalltime disseminator as 
well as the media giant."). 
343. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
344. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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points out, that formulation reveals the paradox of the right of 
privacy: "[I]t is revered by those who live within civil society as 
a means of repudiating the claims that civil society would make 
of them."345 Human beings are social creatures, yet "the con-
cept of privacy embodies the 'moral fact that a person belongs to 
himself and not others nor to society as a whole.' "346 Speaking 
for a unanimous Court in Whalen v. Roe,347 Justice Stevens 
stated that this paradoxical right includes an "individual interest 
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and an "interest in 
independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions. "348 
According to the Supreme Court, although it is a "familiar 
proposition" that inmates lose many rights when they are law-
fully confined,349 it is also true that prisoners do not lose all civil 
liberties.350 As Chief Justice Burger noted in his plurality opin-
ion in Houchins v. KQED, Inc. :351 "Inmates in jails, prisons, or 
mental institutions retain certain fundamental rights of privacy; 
they are not like animals in a zoo to be filmed and photographed 
at will by the public or by media reporters, however 'educa-
tional' the process may be for others."3s2 
Because prisoners retain a constitutional right of privacy, in 
deciding whether executions may be televised over an inmate's 
objection, this right of privacy must be balanced against ·other 
competing "rights." For, while granting the condemned's last 
request may seem reasonable, a sound jurisprudence recognizes 
that the law "mediates most significantly between right and 
right."3s3 In the execution setting, the competing "rights," 
345. TRIBE, supra note 200, at 1302. 
346. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 
747,777 n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFFAIRS 288, 288-89 (1977»; see also TRIBE, supra note 200, § 15-1, at 1302. 
347. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
348. Id. at 599-600. 
349. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). 
350. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (listing several 
prisoner rights); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) ("We have repeatedly 
held that prisons are not beyond the reach of the Constitution. No 'iron curtain' 
separates one from the other."). 
351. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
352. Id. at 5 n.2. 
353. Paul A. Freund, Legal Frameworks for Human Experimentation, in EXPERI-
MENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 105, 105 (paul A. Freund ed., 1970). 
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along with the condemned's privacy interest, include the public's 
interest in witnessing executions and the state's interest in 
deterrence. 
In balancing these interests, courts should consider several 
factors. First, the public's interest in witnessing executions 
should be accorded significant weight. For, not only will tele-
vised executions further the goal of an informed self-govern-
ment, but such events can create societal consensus on capital 
punishment issues.354 Second, because deterrence is a legitimate 
legislative rationale for the death penalty,355 a state's desire to 
televise executions should receive attention because televised ex-
ecutions might arguably deter capital crimes.356 Finally, against 
the interests of the public and the states, courts should consider 
an inmate's wishes. On this point, the approach of Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health,357 the "right-to-die" case, seems particularly apt: "Dy-
ing is personal. And it is profound. For many, the thought of 
an ignoble end . . . is abhorrent. A quiet, proud death . . . is a 
matter of extreme consequence. "358 
Notwithstanding Justice Brennan's eloquent language in 
Cruzan, the Supreme Court is unlikely to allow a condemned 
inmate's privacy interests to outweigh those of the public or the 
states. By way of analogy, consider the case of Cox Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Cohn. 359 In Cox, the identity of a seventeen-year-old 
deceased rape victim was obtained through public records and 
broadcast on television. The victim's father brought suit against 
the reporter and the television station for invasion of privacy, 
354. See infra notes 411-13 and accompanying text. 
355. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185-86 (1976) ("The value of capital punish-
ment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which prop-
erly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in 
terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not avail-
able to the courts."). 
356. See supra, note I. 
357. 497 U.S. 271 (1990). 
358. Id. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Likewise, as one commentator has noted 
in the public execution context: "Sharing his pain and suffering with unrelated ob-
servers should not necessarily be part of the penalty the prisoner pays for his crime." 
Mamantov, supra note 9, at 401. But cf. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 n.7 (citing Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986)) (ChiefJustice Rehnquist did not characterize 
the right to refuse treatment as a privacy right; rather, he framed the issue as one more 
properly analyzed in terms of a fourteenth amendment "liberty interest.") 
359. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
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grounded upon a Georgia statute making it a misdemeanor to 
broadcast the name of a rape victim.360 In ruling that Georgia 
was barred from making the defendant's telecasts the basis of 
civil liability, the Supreme Court favored the press in this 
"sphere of collision" between privacy and free press claims. 361 
The Court stated, "We are reluctant to embark on a course that 
would make public records generally available to the media but 
forbid their pUblication if offensive to the sensibilities of the sup-
posed reasonable man. "362 Because a statutory prohibition 
against the disclosure of a rape victim's name in Cox constituted 
an insufficient competing interest vis-a-vis the press, the 
Supreme Court is unlikely to preserve the privacy of a notorious 
criminal in the face of the public's right to know about his or her 
execution. 363 
360. ld. at 473-74. 
361. ld. at 491. 
362. Id. at 496; see also id. at 491 ("[I]n a society in which each individual has but 
limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his 
government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient form 
the facts of those operations."); id. at 492 ("Without the information provided by the 
press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently 
or to register opinions on the administration of government generally."). 
363. Comment, supra note 80, at 739; Angeja, supra note 124, at 1507-10; see also 
Comment, supra note 80, at 739 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 822) 
("Although there appeared to be a substantial public interest in favor of withholding 
the rape victim's identity in Cox, there does not appear to be any public interest served 
by preserving the privacy of a notorious criminal, especially in light of the 'familiar 
proposition' that incarceration limits the retention of many privileges and rights."); 
Tao, supra note 80, at 1076 ("Even absent [the prisoner's] consent, it is difficult to 
reconcile [the condemned's privacy] interest with statutes such as that in effect in 
California, which mandate semi-public executions by requiring the presence in the 
execution chamber of witnesses other than prison officials and those selected by the 
condemned."). 
According to one commentator, condemned prisoners cannot avoid press cover-
age because they are already the object of such extensive reporting that they have 
become "public figures." Comment, supra note 80, at 740 n.131 (citing Gertz v. Roh-
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 351 (1974»; see also Van Straten v. Milwaukee 
Journal Newspaper-Publisher, 447 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. App. 1989), cerro denied, 496 
U.S. 929 (1990) (inmate was limited purpose public figure who failed to make required 
showing of actual malice in a defamation action against several newspapers); Cox 
Communications, Inc. v. Lowe, 328 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. App.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 982 
(1985) (television station was not liable for invasion of prison inmate's privacy by 
disclosing fact that he was incarcerated, intrudjng upon his seclusion, portraying him 
in a false light or appropriating his likeness in pursuit of pecuniary gain, where inmate 
only incidentally appeared in background of broadcast report concerning alleged 
abuses by prison officials, in light of legitimate public interest served by broadcast); 
Huskey v. Dallas Chronicle, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1057 (D. Or. 1986) (newspa-
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Even if legislatures were given discretion to enact appropri-
ate legislation in the privacy area,364 private executions would 
still be unconstitutional where the condemned person consents 
to the pUblicity. Indeed, in cases where a condemned person 
wants to have the execution filmed, it would be quite perverse to 
deny him or her this final request on the ground that it violated 
his or her own right of privacy. For this reason, any legislative 
scheme providing for a private execution based upon the right of 
privacy must be waivable at the condemned inmate's request.365 
VIII. INTEGRATING THE FIRST AMENDMENT WITH 
TROP V. DULLES 
The First and Eighth Amendments to the United States 
per's publication, in connection with news story concerning plaintiff prisoner's escape 
from custOdy, of photograph that was taken inside jail and that depicted plaintiff being 
booked does not invade plaintifrs privacy); Haynik v. Zimlich, 508 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio. 
Com. PI. 1986) (news reports by media concerning plaintifrs arrest and indictment 
could not, as a matter of law, form the basis for a claim of intrusion upon seclusion 
because matters broadcast had nothing to do with plaintifrs secret, secluded, or pri-
vate concerns, but were matters already within public realm at time of reports); 
Holman v. Central Arkansas Broadcasting, 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979) (POlice of-
ficers, in allowing radio station reporter access to jail block, did not violate attorney's 
right to privacy, because no right to privacy is invaded when state officials facilitate 
publication of official act such as arrest); Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. 
Conn. 1971) (a prison regulation was upheld where it allowed reporters access to a 
prison for stories related to prison life and conditions). But see Huskey v. National 
Broadcasting Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. III. 1986) (prisoner, who had been filmed 
while in "exercise cage," wearing only gym shorts, leaving certain distinct tattoos ex-
posed, who alleged, in his complaint, that he was engaged in "private activities," 
stated claim for invasion of privacy). 
364. One commentator has argued that, regardless of whether the Supreme Court 
finds a constitutional right of access to executions, "independent policy concerns dic-
tate that state legislatures grant at least a limited right of public and press access to 
executions." Mamantov, supra note 9, at 374-75. 
365. See Mamantov, supra note 9, at 403. In California's KQED case, the con-
demned killer, Robert Alton Harris, said he would have "no problem" with television 
cameras recording his execution. In a telephone interview with San Diego television 
station KGTV, Harris said that a televised execution might change some minds about 
capital punishment. "I think that the public is blind to just what type of ordeal a 
person goes through when he's executed," he said. "And that may have a bearing on 
the public opinion on the death penalty in generaL" Associated Press, Condemned 
Killer: "No Problem" with Televised Execution. June 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, Current File. A recent survey of death row inmates in Florida revealed 
substantial support for televised executions among the death row population. See 
Richards & Easter, supra note 57, at 419 & n.l64 (citing survey results from the Com-
mittee on Corrections, Florida House of Representatives, indicating that twenty-one 
inmates, out of twenty-nine survey responses, favored televising executions). 
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Constitution serve widely divergent purposes. While the First 
Amendment protects free speech rights, including the right to 
engage in political discourse,366 the Eighth Amendment prohib-
its states from inflicting "cruel and unusual punishments."367 At 
first blush, these two amendments do not appear to compliment 
each other in any way. Yet, with respect to the constitutionality 
of private execution statutes, this Article argues that Eighth 
Amendment principles, first developed in Trop v. Dulles,368 play 
a role in First Amendment jurisprudence. 
A. "Evolving Standards of Decency" and "Human Dignity" 
According to the Eighth Amendment, "Excessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unu-
sual punishments inflicted."369 Although what constitutes a 
"cruel and unusual punishment" is difficult to delineate, the 
Supreme Court has developed several tests to determine the con-
stitutionality of a particular punishment. In discussing the inter-
action of the First and Eighth Amendments, two Eighth 
Amendment principles are relevant. 
First, under Trop v. Dulles, 370 a punishment must not offend 
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society."371 In determining to what extent society's 
standards have "evolved," members of the Supreme Court look 
"not to [their] own conceptions of decency, but to those of mod-
em American society as a whole."372 As the Court stated in 
Coker v. Georgia,373 "Eighth Amendment judgments should not 
be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual 
Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the 
366. The complete text of the first amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." u.s. CONST., 
amend. I. 
367. U.S. CaNST. amend. VIII. 
368. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
369. U.S. CaNST. amend. VIII; see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 
(1962) (the eighth amendment held applicable to the states through the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment). 
370. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
371. fd. at 101. 
372. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (footnote omitted). 
373. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
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maximum possible extent."374 Foremost among the" 'objective 
indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction' " 
are statutes passed by elected representatives.375 Other objective 
indicia used to determine modem conceptions of decency in-
clude the history of a particular punishment, jury verdicts, and 
international opinion. 376 
Second, under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, a penalty 
must not offend the "dignity of man"-the "basic concept un-
derlying the Eighth Amendment."377 To violate the human dig-
nity principle, the Supreme Court has held that a punishment 
must be "excessive."378 A punishment is unconstitutionally ex-
cessive if it makes no measurable contribution to the accepted 
goals of punishment or is grossly disproportionate to the severity 
of the crime. 379 
As articulated in Gregg, a penalty "so totally without peno-
logical justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of 
suffering" violates the human dignity principle.380 According to 
374. [d. at 592. 
375. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 173 (1976». 
376. See generally Lawrence A. Vanor, Note, The Decency of Capital Punishment 
for Minors: Contemporary Standards and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 
763 (1986) (discussing objective indicia). Notably, some commentators list public 
opinion polls as an "objective indicia." See, e.g., William Wilson, Note, Juvenile Of-
fenders and the Electric Chair: Cruel and Unusual Punishment or Firm Discipline for 
the Hopelessly Delinquent?, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 344, 362 (1983). However, for the 
most part, the Supreme Court has rejected the use of direct public opinion surveys in 
favor of legislative enactments and jury sentencing decisions. See, e.g., Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377 (1989) (declining to use public opinion polls in the eighth 
amendment context); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 (1976) (legislation weighs 
heavily in ascertaining contemporary standards); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 
510,519 n.15 (1968) (one ofthe most important functions a jury performs is maintain-
ing a link between community values and the penal system). 
377. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. Notably, Justice 
Brennan once rejected the notion of public executions in dicta: 
Our concern for decency and human dignity, moreover, has compelled 
changes in the circumstances surrounding the execution itself. No longer 
does our society countenance the spectacle of public executions, once 
thought desirable as a deterrent to criminal behavior by others. Today we 
reject public executions as debasing and brutalizing to us all. 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 297 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
378. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, 187 n.35; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 
788 (1982). 
379. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg, 428 
U.S. at 173. 
380. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-83. 
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Supreme Court precedent, the two penological goals that the 
death penalty serves are deterrence of capital crimes by prospec-
tive offenders and retribution.381 While the Court has noted that 
some studies suggest that "the death penalty may not function as 
a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties,"382 the 
Court has been willing to defer to the judgments of the state 
legislatures in this area.383 The death penalty fulfills its retribu-
tive purpose "by providing an institutional means for society to 
express its moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct, and 
by satisfying society's desire that criminals receive the punish-
ments they deserve."384 
To satisfy the human dignity principle, a punishment also 
must be proportionate to the severity of the crime. If an offender 
receives more punishment than he deserves, then the punish-
ment is considered disproportionate.385 In Coker, for instance, 
the Supreme Court held that the death penalty is always dispro-
portionate to the crime of rape because rapists do not take their 
victims' lives.386 Likewise, in Enmund v. Florida, 387 the Supreme 
Court held that capital punishment is excessive for the crime of 
robbery.388 Thus, in considering the constitutionality of a partic-
ular punishment, courts must weigh the punishment's severity 
against the degree of harm done to the victim.389 
B. Implications for Private Execution Statutes 
Because statutes passed by elected representatives are first 
among the "objective indicia" used to measure society's evolving 
standards with respect to criminal punishments, one might sus-
pect that televised executions violate the Eighth Amendment. 
For, with legislators from every state with capital punishment 
having enacted private execution laws, televised executions 
381. ld. at 182-83. 
382. ld. at 185-88. 
383. See, e.g., id. at 185-86 ("The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of 
crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which properly rests with the legisla-
tures, which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local 
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the courts."). 
384. Vanor, supra note 376, at 765 (footnote omitted). 
385. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. 
386. ld. at 584. 
387. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
388. ld. at 797-801. 
389. Vanor, supra note 376, at 764. 
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appear to violate society's evolving standards. Indeed, when 
coupled with public opinion polls decidedly against televised ex-
ecutions,390 dicta from Justice Brennan's 1972 opinion in 
Furman v. Georgia 391 seems particularly compelling: "Today we 
reject public executions as debasing and brutalizing to us all. "392 
However, this viewpoint ignores two important considera-
tions. First, legislative enactments cannot always be taken at 
face value. Legislators have many motives for passing legisla-
tion, and an act outlawing televised executions should not neces-
sarily be taken as evidence that society finds such executions 
"cruel and unusual punishments." Indeed, historical research 
indicates that private execution statutes were enacted primarily 
in response to pressure from death penalty abolitionists in the 
1830s.393 Furthermore, if public executions are truly "cruel and 
unusual punishments," it seems odd that death row inmates are 
requesting such executions. After all, why would anyone invite 
a cruel and unusual punishment? 
Thus, especially where death row inmates urge televised ex-
ecutions, such executions cannot be viewed as "cruel and unu-
sual punishments." If this is so, then what is the rationale for 
private execution statutes? Are they paternalistic regulations in-
tended to protect the general public from viewing such specta-
cles? Or, even more deviously, are they an attempt to hide the 
way in which government administers justice? 
As a practical matter, private execution statutes were origi-
nally enacted for two reasons: (1) paternalism, and (2) fear on 
the part of death penalty proponents.394 Thus, while some legis-
390. See supra note 50. Significantly, the Supreme Court has noted that "any sug-
gestion that the Government's interest in suppressing speech becomes more weighty as 
popular opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First Amendment." United 
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990). 
391. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
392. Id. at 297; see also Shuman v. State, 578 P.2d 1183, 1188 (Nev. 1978), vacated 
sub nom. Shuman v. Wolff, 571 F. SUpp. 213 (D. Nev. 1983), affd 791 F.2d 788 (9th 
Cir. 1986), affd sub nom. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (Zenoff, C.J., con-
curring) ("Public televising of executions might serve some deterring value; yet even 
supporters of the death penalty shudder at the thought of watching an execution."). 
393. See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text. 
394. See supra note 29 (women and non-elites were excluded from attending execu-
tions after the enactment of private execution laws). Notably, opponents of capital 
punishment in the 1830s may have legitimately believed that the elimination of public 
executions would lead to the total abolition of the death penalty. See MASUR, supra 
note 10, at 113 ("Only in the l840s did [opponents of capital punishment] begin to 
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lators on both sides of the capital punishment debate may want 
to shield people from watching executions, at least some death 
penalty proponents undoubtedly believe that televising execu-
tions will only increase opposition to the death penalty.395 In 
either case, neither rationale provides a legitimate governmental 
interest necessary to validate private execution statutes. 
Interestingly, if the Supreme Court seriously considers the 
jurisprudence of Trop and its progeny, granting the public the 
right to witness executions may be the only way for the Court to 
properly measure the "evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society." To wit: If elected repre-
sentatives are to be used as the primary "objective indicia" of the 
evolving standards, all such representatives - and, more impor-
tantly, the people who elect those representatives - must have 
realize their error. The abolition of public executions not only left capital punishment 
intact, it also neutralized the argument that the spectacle of execution disordered soci-
ety."); id. at 117 ("[T]he elimination of public executions had deprived opponents of 
capital punishment a critical argument: that such spectacles demoralized the 
population."). 
395. One social scientist has argued that "flawed" or "botched" executions could 
lead to the abolition of the death penalty. See Herb Haines, Flawed Executions, the 
Anti-Death Penalty Movement, and the Politics of Capital Punishment, 39 Soc. 
PROBLEMS 125, 127 (1992) ("[1]f flawed executions seem to be occurring with some 
regularity, or if abolitionists are able to turn them into vivid symbols of the death 
penalty's inherent immorality, they may come to threaten the institution of capital 
punishment itself."). Historical evidence indicates that public outrage over bungled 
executions may have led to the abolition of the death penalty in at least two states. Id. 
(citing evidence from Wisconsin); Black, Botched Execution Did in Death Penalty, 
MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, May 12, 1990, at 8A (citing evidence from Minne-
sota). Furthermore, evidence indicates that a series of botched hangings in New York 
during the 1880s may have led to the adoption of a more "humane" form of capital 
punishment: the electric chair. See Haines, supra note 395, at 127. That televised 
versions of botched executions could have a significant impact on public opinion is 
reinforced by the frequency of botched executions. See Michael L. Radelet, Post 
Furman Botched Executions, LIFELINES, No. 50 (1990), at 7 (classifying 12 of approx-
imately 150 post-Furman executions as "botched"); see also Richards & Easter, supra 
note 57, at 399-400 (citing evidence of botched executions in Florida and Texas); cf. 
Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1087 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the grue-
some nature of electrocution). Obviously, a televised execution of an innocent person 
could have an even greater impact on public opinion. Cf. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael 
L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STANFORD L. REv. 
21 (1987) (suggesting that at least 139 innocent people were sentenced to death in the 
United States between 1900 and 1985 and that 23 of these people were actually put to 
death); Alabama Death Row Inmate Is Set Free, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, Mar. 
3, 1993, at 7A (a man condemned to death over four years earlier released because of 
his innocence). 
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full access to information regarding capital punishment. 396 If 
not, each time the Supreme Court employs "evolving standards 
of decency" in the Eighth Amendment context, the Court will be 
getting an inaccurate measure of such standards. This could re-
sult in the Court declaring some punishments acceptable, when 
society - if fully informed - would find such punishments 
"cruel and unusual." Under the same principle, some punish-
ments could be declared unconstitutional, when society would 
approve of such punishments if adequately informed. 
Two death penalty cases, Furman v. Georgia 397 and Gregg v. 
Georgia,398 demonstrate this hypothesis at work. In 1972 in 
Furman, the United States Supreme Court struck down state 
death penalty statutes fraught with unbridled jury discretion.399 
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan concluded that the 
death penalty's "rejection by contemporary society is virtually 
total."400 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan focused 
on the history of "successive restriction[s]" on capital punish-
ment and the "increasingly rare" application of the penalty.401 
However, the public's "backlash" to Furman was severe, with 
thirty-five states reenacting death penalty legislation in "a vir-
tual stampede. "402 
Thus, when the Court in Gregg upheld a death sentence 
four years later, Justices Powell, Stevens, and Stewart readily 
conceded that the state reenactments had "undercut" Furman's 
premise: "It is now evident that a large proportion of American 
society continues to regard [capital punishment] as an appropri-
ate and necessary criminal sanction."403 Despite this concession, 
however, Justice Marshall insisted that "the American people, 
[it] fully informed as to the purposes of the death penalty and its 
liabilities, would in my view reject it as morally unaccept-
396. This is especially true in states like California, where citizens have the oppor-
tunity to vote on referendums with respect to capital punishment. See Plaintifrs Trial 
Brief at 16 n.18, KQED, Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rptr. 2323 (N.D. Cal. 1991) 
(No. C90-1383RHS). 
397. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
398. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
399. Furman. 408 U.S. at 238. 
400. Id. at 305. 
401. Id. at 299. 
402. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 65 (1980). 
403. Gregg. 428 U.S. at 179. 
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able."404 In particular, Marshall stressed that the constitutional-
ity of capital punishment turns "on the opinion of an informed 
citizenry," and that, therefore, "even the enactment of new 
death statutes cannot be viewed as conclusive."40s 
In his book, Death Penalties, Raoul Berger criticizes Justice 
Marshall's approach. Rejecting the notion that "statutes must 
yield to Marshall's speculations as to what the people would do 
if informed of data Marshall deems decisive," Berger relies on 
the philosopher Sidney Hook to support his position.406 Accord-
ing to Hook, "It is arrogant [to assume that] some self-selected 
404. Id. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall continued: 
In Furman, I observed that the American people are largely unaware of the 
information critical to a judgment on the morality of the death penalty, and 
concluded that if they were better informed they would consider it shocking, 
unjust, and unacceptable ..•• A recent study, conducted after the enactment 
of the post-Furman statutes, has confirmed that the American people know 
little about the death penalty, and that the opinions of an informed public 
would differ significantly from those of a public unaware of the consequences 
and effects of the death penalty. 
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 360-69 
and Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth 
Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 WIS. L. REv. 171). 
405. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Social 
science studies have shown that the general public lacks knowledge about the death 
penalty and that information about capital punishment often changes attitudes with 
respect to the death penalty. See generally Robert M. Bohm, American Death Penalty 
Opinion, 1936-1986: A Critical Examination of the Gallup Polls, in THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT REsEARCH 130-37 (Robert M. Bohm ed., 1991); Rob-
ert M. Bohm et aI., Knowledge and Death Penalty Opinion: A Test of the Marshall 
Hypotheses, 28 J. REs. CRIME & DELINQ. 360 (1991); Robert M. Bohm, The Effects of 
Classroom Instruction and Discussion on Death Penalty Opinions: A Teaching Note, 17 
J. CRIM. JUST. 123 (1989); James O. Finckenauer, Public Support for the Death Pen-
alty: Retribution as Just Deserts or Retribution as Revenge?, 5 JUST. Q. 81 (1988); 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close 
Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 116 
(1983); Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 404, at 171; Neil Vidmar & Tony Dittenhoffer, 
Informed Public Opinion and Death Penalty Attitudes, 23 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOL-
OGY 43 (1981); Robert M. Bohm, Death Penalty Opinions: A Classroom Experience 
and Public Commitment, 60 Soc. INQUIRY 285 (1990). But see Charles G. Lord et a!., 
Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subse-
quently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 2098 (1979) 
(concluding that information or knowledge about the death penalty polarized opin-
ions, instead of changing them from in favor to opposed or vice versa). For a social 
science study exploring the relationship between public opinion and retribution in the 
context of the death penalty, see Robert M. Bohm, Retribution and Capital Punish-
ment: Toward a Better Understanding of Death Penalty Opinion, 20 J. CRIM. JUST. 227 
(1992). 
406. RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 126 (1982). 
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elite can better determine what the best interests of other citizens 
are than those citizens themselves."407 However, in the context 
of private execution laws, Berger's criticism of Justice Marshall 
can be turned on its head. For, by continuing to deprive the 
public of vital information regarding capital punishment, private 
execution statutes embody the paternalism that Hook so vehe-
mently rejects. Ironically, unless televised executions are al-
lowed, the public may be denied access to the very information 
which Justice Marshall deems so decisive. 
In today's society, the influence of television cannot be un-
derestimated. Roper surveys since 1964 list television as 
America's number one news source,40S and "it cannot be denied 
that television news coverage plays an increasingly prominent 
part in informing the public at large of the workings of govern-
ment."409 Indeed, speaking in the trial context, Justice Harlan 
once mused that "televising [trials] might well provide the most 
accurate and comprehensive means of conveying their content to 
the public."410 A growing number of cable television stations 
407. SIDNEY HOOK, PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 29 (1980). 
408. See Charles E. Ares, Chandler v. Florida: Television, Criminal Trials and Due 
Process, 1981 SUP. Cr. REv. 157, 174 n.74 (1982) (citing ROPER ORGANIZATION, 
PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF TELEVISION AND OTHER MAss MEDIA: A TwENTY YEAR 
REVIEW, 1959-1979». The average adult in the United States spends more than 
thirty hours each week watching television. A.C. NIELSEN CO., NIELSEN REpORT ON 
TELEVISION 8 (1990). Furthennore, 69% of such adults acquire most of their news 
from television. Rod Granger, Cable Viewers Want Big 3, Study Finds, ELECTRONIC 
MEDIA, May 6, 1991, at 8 (citing ROPER ORGANIZATION, "America's Watching: 
Public Attitudes Towards Television"). While the combined circulation of the three 
major news magazines-Time, Newsweek, and u.s. News and World Report-is just 
over ten million, television news reaches over 200,000,000 viewers in the United 
States. See OXBRIDGE COMMUNICATIONS, INC., THE STANDARD PERIODICAL DI-
RECTORY 1127-28 (13th ed. 1990); VANDERBILT TELEVISION NEWS ARCHIVE, TEL-
EVISION NEWS INDEX AND ABSTRACTS (Jan. 1976 - Dec. 1987). Only two percent of 
the population gets its news from sources exclusive of television. TIOlRoper Report, 
"America's Watching: 30th Anniversary, 1959-1989, at 27. Televising executions is of 
added importance because thirteen percent of U.S. citizens are either illiterate or func-
tionally illiterate. Richard Weizel, From New Words, New Worlds, N.Y. TIMES, May 
3, 1992, § 13CN, at 1 (citing United States Department of Education statistics). 
Moreover, Americans regard television as the most complete and unbiased source of 
news. THE ROPER ORGANIZATION, TRENDS IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS TELEVISION 
AND OTHER MEDIA: A TwENTY-FOUR YEAR REVIEW 4 (1983). 
409. Cable News Network v. American Broadcasting Co., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (electronic media have a right to be included in the press pool for 
"limited coverage" of White House events); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 
726, 748 (1978) (broadcasting's "uniquely pervasive presence"). 
410. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 531, 589 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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such as CNN and C-SP AN-providing live, extended cover-
age-promise to make television an even more potent medium 
for news dissemination. 
Given television's tremendous impact on society, televising 
executions will undoubtedly influence the capital punishment 
debate. Some proponents of capital punishment may switch 
sides after viewing an execution, and some death penalty oppo-
nents may be persuaded, after watching an execution, that capi-
tal punishment is not so bad after all.411 Whatever the impact of 
televised executions, though, society's attitudes regarding capital 
punishment will change.412 Additionally, the infusion of infor-
mation into the death penalty debate may alter society's views 
on related matters. For example, society may develop a consen-
sus regarding the most humane form of capital punishment (i.e., 
hanging, firing squad, electrocution, lethal gas or lethal 
injection}.413 
411. A recent public opinion poll asked whether viewing an execution on television 
would make people more in favor of the death penalty, less in favor, or wouldn't it 
change their mind. While 14% of respondents felt that viewing an execution would 
make them more in favor of the death penalty, 36% felt that it would make them 
more opposed to capital punishment. Forty percent believed that a televised execu-
tions wouldn't change their minds, while 10% weren't sure. See Roper Center for 
Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut (1991) (WESTLAW, POLL 
database). For more than two decades, public opinion surveys consistently have 
found that two-thirds of the population favors capital punishment. FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN 
AGENDA 15 (1986). 
412. Cj. Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 404, at 195 (a study concluding that exposure 
to information about the death penalty changed the subjects' attitudes). Anita Hill's 
Congressional testimony and the Rodney King video amply demonstrate the impact 
of television coverage with respect to public discourse on issues like harassment in the 
workplace and police brutality. 
413. See Martin R. Gardner, Executions and Indignities-An Eighth Amendment 
Assessment of Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 96 (1978); 
Angeja, supra note 124, at 1514-16 (arguing that televised executions may develop 
societal consensus regarding the most humane form of capital punishment); see also 
Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1086-88 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justices 
Brennan and Marshall dissented from a denial of certiorari where the defendant had 
claimed that use of the electric chair constituted cruel and unusual punishment under 
the eighth amendment); Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1241 (1983) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from a denial of certiorari where 
the defendant had claimed that use of the gas chamber constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment under the eighth amendment). 
That more information about the method of inflicting capital punishment may 
change attitudes about the most humane form of punishment is supported by an exe-
cution that took place in Arizona just prior to Robert Alton Harris' execution in 
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Because jury determinations are also an "objective indicia" 
of "evolving standards of decency,"414 a jury should be allowed 
to view an execution film at the defendant's request. This would 
assure that jury determinations at the sentencing phase do 
California. The gas chamber execution in Arizona, which took place on April 6, 1992, 
was described by witnesses to the execution, including media representatives, as a hor-
rible occurrence. See Gruesome Death in Gas Chamber Pushes Arizona Toward Injec-
tions. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1992, at 9. Immediately after the execution, the Arizona 
Attorney General called for the abandonment of that mode of execution and efforts 
were made in the state legislature to amend the law. See Reinhardt, supra note 132, at 
219; Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 132, at 267. But compare id. at 269-70 ("Nor 
does the subsequent opinion of the Arizona Attorney General, who is merely one 
government official, demonstrate the necessary consensus within Arizona that the gas 
chamber is an inappropriate mode of execution. . . . The pendency in the Arizona 
legislature of a bill to change that state's mode of execution also does not make Harris' 
claim [of 'cruel and unusual punishment'] more plausible, because the law authorizing 
use ofthe gas chamber in Arizona remains on the books.") with id. at 270 n.70 (noting 
that a recent amendment in California gives capital defendants a choice between the 
gas chamber and lethal injection). 
Significantly, the increased debate that televised executions would spur might 
also affect the public's views with respect to (1) the monetary costs of administering 
the death penalty, (2) the appropriateness of capital punishment for juveniles, and (3) 
the appropriateness of capital punishment for the mentally or physically impaired. 
See Dorothy O. Lewis et al., Psychiatric. Neurological. and Psychoeducational Charac-
teristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States. 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838 
(1986) (a study of 15 death row inmates finding that all 15 "had histories of severe 
head injury, five had major neurological impairment, and seven others had other, less 
serious neurological problems"). Aside from the myriad issues surrounding the death 
penalty that televised executions would also stimulate debate about, increased news 
coverage associated with televised executions might also publicize the racial bias in 
capital sentencing decisions. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY (1990); SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND 
DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989). 
414. As the Supreme Court has previously observed, "the jury ... is a significant 
and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved." 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181; see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 
519 n.15 (1968) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion): 
[O]ne of the most important functions any jury can perform ... is to main-
tain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system-
a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect 
"the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society." 
To the extent that prospective jurors opposed to the death penalty can be ex-
cluded from jury panels, the Supreme Court's decisions in Witherspoon and Wain-
wright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) are inconsistent with the eighth amendment 
principle that punishments must not violate the "evolving standards of decency" be-
cause the jury panel does not fully reflect community values. Cj Morgan v. Illinois, 
112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992) (a defendant in a capital case has a constitutional right to 
remove potential jurors who would automatically vote for execution in the event of 
conviction). 
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"mark the progress of a maturing society." Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine information more relevant to a capital sentencing deci-
sion than an execution film. For, along with balancing the ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances of a crime at the 
sentencing phase, juries must also fashion the punishment to fit 
the crime. In this respect, not only is viewing an execution film 
relevant to a jury's sentencing decision, but the unconstitutional-
ity of disproportionate punishments demands that a jury be al-
lowed to view such a film. After all, how can a jury assess the 
appropriateness of capital punishment without knowing how the 
death penalty is administered and how such a sentence affects -
both physically and psychologically - a person on death row or 
in the execution chamber? 
Additionally, allowing juries to view execution films is fully 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Beginning with Lock-
ett v. Ohio 41S in 1978, the Court has consistently held that the 
Eighth Amendment requires that the sentencer not be precluded 
from considering any mitigating evidence in deciding whether to 
impose the death penalty.416 Although Lockett dealt with evi-
dence regarding the defendant's character and the circumstances 
of the offense, given the "qualitative difference" between the 
death penalty and other punishments,417 defendants should be 
allowed to present execution film footage as mitigating evidence 
415. 438 u.s. 586 (1978). 
416. According to the precise language of the Lockett plurality, "the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capi-
tal case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a 
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the 
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 
(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 
104, 114-15 (1982) (A majority of the Court held that "[t]he sentencer, and the [state 
appellate court] on review, may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating 
evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their 
consideration."); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 679 n.2 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) ("Eight members of the Court agree that Lockett remains good law .... "). 
417. See, e.g., CaIifornia v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) ("[T]he qualitative 
difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater de-
gree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination."); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 
(plurality opinion) (The "qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls 
for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed."); Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (plurality opinion) (because of that qualitative dif-
ference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determina-
tion that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 
605 {"Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different 
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during the sentencing phase.418 Indeed, dissenting in Thompson 
v. Oklahoma,419 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
White suggested in dicta that no constitutional violation oc-
curred where color photographs of a victim were introduced at 
the sentencing phase of a capital murder case.420 If color photo-
graphs of a victim - such as the ones in Thompson "showing 
gunshot wounds in the head and chest, and knife slashes in the 
throat, chest and abdomen" - are "probative" and not "unduly 
infiammatory,"421 then an execution film can hardly be consid-
ered irrelevant to a jury's sentencing decision. 
As to Trop's admonition that a punishment not offend the 
"dignity of man," filming an execution, even over the death row 
from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized deci-
sion is essential in capital cases."). 
418. Prosecutors opposed to the introduction of such evidence are likely to argue 
that execution footage is only intended to create sympathy for the accused. However, 
mercy is often considered an appropriate element for the jury to consider when decid-
ing whether to impose a death sentence. See Bruce I. McDaniel, Annotation, Instruc-
tions to Jury: Sympathy to Accused as Appropriate Factor in Jury Consideration, 72 
A.L.R.3d 842 (citing cases). As one commentator has stated: 
[C]hoosing whether another is to live or die is a disturbing and daunting 
moral challenge. This decision should not be made purely by following rules 
or by weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Rational decision 
procedures imply that no one has really made a choice, and that implication 
is one which is not acceptable in a supposedly moral society. Empathy and 
emotion are properly injected into decisions about capital punishment. 
Paul W. Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99 
YALE L.J. 389,409 (1989) (footnote omitted). Compare California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 
538 (1987) (an instruction requiring jurors to ignore "mere sentiment, conjecture, 
sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling" was not unconstitu-
tional) with Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 509-10 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (an 
instruction requiring jurors to "avoid any influence of sympathy, sentiment, passion, 
prejUdice or other arbitrary factor" should be declared unconstitutional because it 
forbids the jury from taking into account any evidence that evoked a sympathetic 
response) and id. at 513 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("sympathy" is "an important ingre-
dient in the Eighth Amendment's requirement of an individualized sentencing deter-
mination) and Cisarik v. Palos Community Hosp. 579 N.E.2d 873 (Ill. 1991) 
(pennitting use of day-in-the-life video in medical malpractice action). 
419. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). The Supreme Court in Thompson held that the imposi-
tion of the death penalty on a 15-year-old boy violated the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
420. [d. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because of the Court's disposition of the 
eighth amendment issue, the Court in Thompson did not address the issue of whether 
photographic evidence that a state court deems erroneously admitted but harmless at 
the guilt phase nevertheless violates a capital defendant's constitutional rights by vir-
tue of being admitted at the penalty phase. [d. at 838 n.48. 
421. Id. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Number 3] TELEVISED EXECUTIONS 431 
inmate's objection, would not violate this principle. First, tele-
vised executions would arguably make a measurable contribu-
tion to the accepted goals of punishment. In this regard, the 
words of Chief Justice Burger in Richmond Newspapers are par-
ticularly significant: "When a shocking crime occurs, a commu-
nity reaction of outrage and public protest often follows. 
Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important pro-
phylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, 
hostility, and emotion."422 Finding the "keystone" of open 
criminal trials to be "the therapeutic value of open justice, "423 
Chief Justice Burger stated as follows: 
Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante 
the enforcement of criminal laws, but they cannot erase from peo-
ple's consciousness the fundamental, natural yearning to see justice 
done - or even the urge for retribution. The crucial prophylactic 
aspects of the administration of justice cannot function in the dark; 
no community catharsis can occur if justice is "done in a comer [or] 
in any covert manner ... 424 
According to Chief Justice Burger, "[T]he appearance of justice 
can best be provided by allowing people to observe it. . .. People 
in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institu-
tions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohib-
ited from observing. "425 Thus, not only are televised executions 
consistent with retributive theory,426 but such events would ar-
422. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (citation 
omitted). 
423. Id. at 569. 
424. Id. at 571 (quoting 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, 
reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 188 (R. Perry ed., 1959». 
425. Id. at 572. In Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), where 
the Court held that access to voir dire proceedings outweighed the state's interest in 
protecting the privacy of prospective jurors in a capital case, Chief Justice Burger 
reiterated the "community therapeutic value" in openness. According to Burger: 
"When the public is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice 
system is functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and 
emotions" like "retribution." Id. at 508-09. 
426. See generally Bruce Beddow, Retributive Theory and Public Executions 8 
(Nov. 30, 1990) (unpublished manuscript) ("[T]here is no better way to feel that jus-
tice is being done, than to see it being done." (emphasis in original». Notably, some 
commentators argue that retributive theory does not require capital punishment, with 
some suggesting that the death penalty is immoral under retributive principles. See 
JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 223-49 (1979); HER-
BERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE (1976); Robert A. Pugsley, A Retribu-
tivist Argument Against Capital Punishment, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1501 (1981); M. 
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guably further the principle of deterrence.427 Finally, televised 
executions are not disproportionate to the crimes that death row 
inmates commit, especially considering the heinous nature of 
many of those crimes. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In the past, constitutional challenges to private execution 
statutes have focused primarily on the right of the press to at-
tend executions. In Garrett v. Estelle 428 and Keams-Tribune v. 
Utah Board of Corrections,429 for example, broadcast journalists 
challenged restrictions on the filming of executions on Equal 
Protection grounds. Additionally, challenges have been brought 
alleging unlawful prior restraint and a constitutional right of ac-
cess for the press to attend executions. 
However, these constitutional challenges have failed for 
several reasons. First, each of these challenges have been unable 
to overcome the principle that the government does not have to 
give the press special access to information not shared by the 
public generally. 430 Second, litigants challenging private execu-
tion statutes have tried to use long-standing legal doctrines in 
novel and perhaps undesirable ways. For instance, it was argued 
in Garrett that the proposed closed circuit television broadcast of 
an execution was a "publication" invoking the prior restraint 
doctrine. However, the prior restraint doctrine was intended 
primarily to prohibit government censorship of information al-
ready in the hands of private parties,431 and the journalists 
watching the closed circuit broadcast in Garrett never had a 
videotape of the execution in their possession. Likewise, in both 
Garrett and Keams-Tribune, the plaintiffs brought Equal Protec-
tion challenges on the ground that broadcast journalists are fun-
damentally different than print journalists. Although a 
television broadcast is often a more potent medium than a news-
paper story, some private execution statutes do not expressly 
Margaret Falls, Retribution, Reciprocity. and Respect for Persons. 6 LAW & PHIL. 25 
(1987); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES 26 n.4 (1987). 
427. See supra note 1. 
428. 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977). 
429. 2 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1353 (D. Utah 1977). 
430. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 
U.S. 843 (1974). 
431. See supra Section VII(A). 
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provide for the attendance of media representatives. \ Further-
more, states have, to date, successfully countered Equal Protec-
tion attacks by throwing up "sham" justifications for private 
execution laws, with one state even attempting to exclude all 
journalists from executions in an attempt to moot an Equal Pro-
tection challenge.432 
To challenge private execution laws more effectively, liti-
gants must question the premise of their attack. Instead of ask-
ing if the press has a right to televise executions, litigants must 
ask whether the public has a right to witness executions. Indeed, 
because states may attempt to stifle press challenges altogether 
by allowing no witnesses at all at execution proceedings,433 ask-
ing if the public has a right to witness executions may be the 
only way to preserve the press' right to attend and televise such 
events. 
Given the shortcomings of broadcasters' prior restraint and 
Equal Protection challenges, litigants must assert that the public 
has a constitutional right to view executions. This right should 
be rooted in history and should focus on the lack of governmen-
tal interests supporting private execution statutes. Similarly, pri-
vate execution laws should be challenged as impermissible 
restrictions on the content of speech.434 Indeed, because the pro-
priety of capital punishment is a political issue43S-and because 
private execution laws were originally enacted, and are still 
432. See supra Section IV. 
433. Recently, in KQED's lawsuit challenging San Quentin's private execution 
regulations, the warden of San Quentin, Daniel Vasquez, tried this tactic. Williams, 
supra note 107, at A23. In that attempt, Vasquez told a reporter that he changed the 
long-standing policy with Gov. Wilson's approval so that Judge Schnacke could not 
rule that since reporters are allowed to attend executions they should be allowed to 
use the tools of their trade. Rosenfeld, Warden Afraid of Revenge on Guards if Execu-
tions on TV, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, at AS. However, in his ruling, Judge 
Schnacke decided that all reporters could not be excluded from witnessing executions. 
KQED Inc. v. Vasquez, 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2323,2324 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
434. In particular, it could be argued that the media should be given "effective" 
access to executions under Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Houchins. See 
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
435. Capital punishment has become a critical issue in many elections throughout 
the United States. See Tao, supra note 80, at 1042 n.4 (citing articles). For example, 
in a Gallup poll taken after the 1988 election, the death penalty was given as a very 
important issue in deciding for whom to vote for fifty-seven percent of Bush voters 
and thirty-eight percent ofDukakis vot~rs. George Gallup, Jr. & Alec Gallup, "Pub-
lic Support for Death Penalty is Highest in Gallup Annals" (1988). 
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maintained, for paternalistic reasons or to impede the debate 
surrounding capital punishment-private execution laws should 
be strictly scrutinized under the First Amendment. Ultimately, 
decisions about whether to broadcast executions should be left in 
the hands of journalists, just as the general public must decide 
whether to watch executions. The government should not be 
given the right to decide what is appropriate television viewing 
or what is appropriate for journalists and editors to broadcast. 
In assessing the constitutionality of private execution stat-
utes, the history of public executions cannot be emphasized 
enough. For, as illustrated in the death penalty and the right of 
access to trial cases, members of the Supreme Court often em-
ploy historical analyses in reaching their decisions. And, while 
the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, by defini-
tion, could have had no intent regarding televised executions, 
this fact does not render history irrelevant.436 On the contrary, 
for the ardent originalist, the one fact that would be relevant is 
that the framers approved of large crowds of people watching 
executions. Although this fact may not carry much weight for 
the nonoriginalist, it does not inhibit the Supreme Court from 
finding a constitutional right of access to executions.437 
436. The fact that televised trials are not permitted in some federal and state courts 
does not preclude the finding of a public right to witness televised executions. Simply 
stated, the reasons given for excluding cameras in the courtroom---disruption of the 
proceedings and the potential effect of cameras on jurors, witnesses and judges---do 
not apply in the execution context. Furthermore, 44 states currently allow video cam-
eras in the courtroom for various reasons, and the federal courts' policy regarding 
cameras in the courtroom is being revised, with the Judicial Conference having al-
ready authorized some experimentation. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. 
Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 512 & n. 14 (1992); see also id. at 510 ("We 
live in an era of 'paratexts,' in which words and images, as captured by electronic 
recording, compete with print to represent legally significant events."). 
437. In Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan stated in his concurring opinion 
that "the case for a right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring and 
vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information." Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (cita-
tion omitted). Because the United States, until the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, had a long tradition of unrestricted public access to executions, the notion 
that the public has a right to view executions is particularly strong. Indeed, the pub-
lic's right to receive information has been frequently recognized by the Supreme 
Court. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 367-68 (1990); Virginia 
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,756 (1976); Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 
308 (1965). 
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Regardless of judicial philosophy, however, an historical 
approach based upon more than the framers' intent, provides a 
compelling argument for finding private execution statutes un-
constitutional when coupled with the jurisprudence of the First 
Amendment and Trop v. Dulles. 438 Truly ascertaining the 
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society" only can be realized through robust debate. Fur-
thermore, the government cannot be allowed to stop the natural 
evolution of debate on a public issue by privatizing conduct, es-
pecially on an issue as important as the death penalty.439 
According to historians, a primary reason that executions 
were privatized was a powerful movement to abolish capital 
punishment in the 1830s.44O If this is so, by reducing the availa-
bility of information to the public regarding capital punishment, 
state governments engaged in a "cover-up" beginning in the 
nineteenth century. Although the continuation of public execu-
tions may not have resulted in the abolition of the death penalty, 
it is reasonable to assume that the public's perception of the 
death penalty would be different today if the United States had 
continued the practice of public executions. In order for society 
to continue its evolution on the capital punishment issue-either 
pro or con-it is imperative that broadcast journalists, acting as 
representatives of the people, be allowed to televise executions. 
438. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
439. Currently, there are over 2,500 inmates on Death Row. Mark Hansen, Final 
Justice: Limiting Death Row Appeals, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1992, at 64. Furthennore, the 
debate surrounding capital punishment will become even more significant if Congress 
expands the use of the death penalty through federal crime bills. See H.R. 3371, 102d 
Cong. 2d Sess. (1992); 138 CONGo !tEc. S3939 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1992) (statement of 
Sen. Biden) ("This bill adds 53 death penalty offenses-the single largest expansion of 
the Federal death penalty in the history of the Congress."). 
440. Mamantov, supra note 9, at 375; see also MACKEY, supra note 18, at 115-19 
(1982) (containing a discussion of how abolitio$ts opposed private execution statutes 
in New York). 
